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Executive summary 
Key points 
x Safe, adequate, affordable and appropriate housing is critical to health, wellbeing 
and social and economic security, but many Australians cannot find housing in 
the private market, and the social housing system, incorporating public and 
community housing, is under-resourced and manifestly unable to meet demand.  
x As a form of spatially fixed, materially realised capital expenditure that supports 
a range of social objectives in areas like public health, economic development 
and addressing market failure in the housing market, social housing is a form of 
essential social infrastructure that warrants public investment. However, 
political will remains the critical determinant of the level of that investment.  
x Policy-makers argue that cost-benefit analysis (CBA) and related business case 
techniques could be usefully applied to build the case for investment in social 
housing. However, the following factors must be considered. 
 The core benefits of social housing are not easily quantified or monetised and are thus 
often overlooked or excluded from such assessments. The benefits attributable to social 
housing, such as social inclusion, education and employment, are not measured or traded 
in markets. They occur over extended periods of time and are often multi-dimensional.  
 The use of public health evaluation methodologies may provide a better basis for social 
housing appraisal than other approaches (for example, the housing-adjusted life years 
approach, adapted from health economics).  
x Investment in other forms of social infrastructure, such as schools and hospitals, 
is typically based on the spatial distribution of need over time. Historically, this 
has not been the case for social housing. 
x We analysed the extent and spatial distribution of need for social housing and 
the cost of its procurement in 88 different land and construction markets across 
Australia. The results show that over the next 20 years, 727,300 additional social 
housing dwellings will be required, with current-price procurement costs varying 
from $146,000 to $614,000 per dwelling, depending on local land values, 
building types and construction costs in different regions. 
x Even with efficient financing provided by the National Housing Finance and 
Investment Corporation (NHFIC), there remains a considerable funding gap. We 
undertook financial modelling to identify the most effective strategy to address 
this gap, finding that needs based capital investment (NBC) supplemented by 
efficient financing provides the most cost-effective pathway for Australia. A 
model with no upfront capital investment, reliant on commercial financing and 
funded by an operating subsidy is substantially more expensive. 
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Key findings 
Even when social housing is considered as infrastructure, this is not sufficient 
for making the case for social housing 
Between 1951 and 1996, Australian jurisdictions built 8,000 to 14,000 social housing dwellings 
per year (Troy 2012). Social housing building programs were funded through direct public 
investment, via grants and long-term loans. Analysis of Australian Bureau of Statistics (ABS) 
figures (Groenhart and Burke 2014: 12) shows plummeting public sector residential construction 
since the 1970s, with a short rise during the Global Financial Crisis (GFC) via the National 
Rental Affordability Scheme (NRAS) and the Social Housing Initiative (SHI). With continuing 
sales and demolitions, Australia’s public housing stock is declining (down 20,000 since 2007) 
and its share in the housing market is shrinking (4.4% nationally, lower in Victoria) (AHURI 
2017a).  
In Australia, changing attitudes to the role of government and economic policy have meant that 
funding and other support for the social housing system has steadily declined over the past 
decades, and more recent interest in increasing diversity and contestability within the system 
has, to date, had only limited effect. 
While there is a strong historical precedent to regard the social housing system as making a 
broad social and economic contribution by promoting decent living conditions for all Australians 
regardless of income, social housing is still largely judged as a service to disadvantaged 
households reliant on government benefits. This categorisation of social housing means 
arguments to cast social housing as a necessary component of urban planning have yet to gain 
traction. At a time when governments prioritise reducing tax rates and discretionary spending, 
there is little enthusiasm for increasing investment in affordable housing for disadvantaged 
communities. 
There is increasing interest in methods of calculating the benefits of social housing relative to 
cost, including the savings that might accrue in other areas of government expenditure but 
extending to the broader economic contribution that social housing can make by enabling 
economic and social participation among tenants. New investment is required to ensure cities 
function well and that aggregate consumer demand is not adversely affected by rising housing 
costs, and the provision of social housing has a part to play in these efforts.1 
Interviewees repeatedly emphasised the importance of a publicly funded subsidy to ‘fill the gap’ 
and for government funding to supplement the finance that will be made available through the 
NHFIC. However, there are difficulties in advancing a case for increases in recurrent 
expenditure through existing budget processes. As a result, most of the interviewees were 
pessimistic about the prospects for a reconceptualisation of social housing as infrastructure, 
however convincing, to achieve much in the way of meaningful change. 
Social housing requires an ‘infrastructure investment pathway’ 
An ‘infrastructure investment pathway’ is the route capital takes to construct and operate assets 
and services to deliver social and economic benefits to broader society. Both funding and 
financing play an integral role in this pathway. ‘Funding’ describes the resources allocated by 
governments and the community to cover capital investment and operating costs. ’Financing’ 
describes the instruments or arrangements through which these costs, especially high upfront 
                                               
 
1 A number of interviewees saw City Deals and other place-based initiatives as a potential vehicle by which 
social housing organisations could secure much-needed investment for new housing. These initiatives are only 
embryonic, however, and operate at a local, rather than national, scale. 
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capital costs, are spread over time as government surpluses and service charges allow. Seen in 
this light, financing ultimately requires funding and is not a replacement for it. 
While users of infrastructure are increasingly called on to pay for associated services through 
various charges, full payment can undermine the social and economic benefits they are 
intended to deliver. For this reason, services such as health and education are neither delivered 
on a full fee-paying basis nor driven to generate surpluses or even be cost recovering. These 
services are intentionally subsidised to maximise the social and economic benefits they are 
designed to deliver. The design and use of subsidies are integral to all needs-based services, 
and their use must also be equitable, efficient and effective. More recently, the government has 
acknowledged the importance of targeted public investment to address the infrastructure needs 
of our growing cities (Taylor 2017). 
Greater capacity in needs-based planning, securing and allocating adequate 
funds, and designing and implementing programs is required 
Australia’s social housing is tightly targeted and its market share is declining. A range of 
investment pathways have been pursued in recent decades, including contracting out services, 
raising off-balance-sheet debt via community housing organisations (CHOs), mixed 
redevelopment and densification, as well as asset sales and cross-subsidisation. These 
strategies have overseen the decline of social housing construction and will not generate 
sufficient units to address Australia’s backlog and growing need.  
Transnational organisations, such as the International Monetary Fund, have set out arguments 
for more effective public investment and efficient financing of infrastructure, stressing greater 
capacity in needs-based planning, securing and allocating adequate funds, and designing and 
implementing programs (IMF 2015: 13). To maximise social and economic outcomes, social 
housing requires a capital investment strategy informed by current and future needs. 
A more ambitious and effective pathway is required, which grows and improves the social 
housing stock. Australia can learn from the practices of other nation states where national 
housing strategies include more productive strategies to boost social housing supply. 
Productive social housing systems use a combination of policy instruments to reduce the cost of 
land, invest strategic equity and lever efficient long-term financing. Productive social housing 
systems do not rely solely on demand-side subsidies, which have proved ineffective when rents 
are deregulated and vacancies low. The use of grants and efficient financing not only reduces 
long-term costs to government, but also reduces pressure on service charges and related 
assistance in other policy areas.  
Greater transparency in comparing the cost of capital and requirement for additional recurrent 
subsidies is vital to help policy-makers and program designers determine the ideal mix of 
funding and financing that should be used to address Australia’s social housing deficit. 
Housing need and procurement costs vary across different land and housing 
markets, necessitating a nuanced strategy 
To calculate the government capital investment required to address need over time, including 
the current backlog, it is necessary to estimate: (i) the scale of unmet need, (ii) the total cost of 
providing the homes required to meet that need (bearing in mind its spatial distribution), and (iii) 
the portion of that cost that is in excess of what housing providers should be able to finance 
through private debt.  
Our analysis of unmet need examined levels of homelessness and housing stress amongst very 
low-income in the lowest income quintile (Q1) households renting privately. It found a need for 
construction of some 730,000 new social dwellings over the next 20 years. Need is unevenly 
spread and growth rates also differ across Australia. Figure 1, below, illustrates the number, 
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proportion and location of social housing units needed to address the current deficit and rising 
need over time, to 2036. 
Figure 1: Location and number of social housing units needed to 2036 
Note: All figures are in ‘000s. 
Source: Lawson, Pawson et al. (2018). 
Total procurement costs vary for regions within each state and territory. This variation includes 
land and construction costs, as well as estimated professional fees (legal and design services), 
and local impact fees/infrastructure contributions. Affordable rents can only cover part of this 
cost of procuring, managing and maintaining this body of housing. For this reason, a spatially 
nuanced subsidy will be required to fill the remaining funding gap.  
Direct investment pathway is the most cost-effective 
We examined the best way to fund and finance this gap via multi-criteria financial analysis and 
financial modelling. Building on the Affordable Housing Assessment Tool (AHAT) developed for 
the AHURI Inquiry into increasing affordable housing supply (Randolph, Troy et al. 2018), 
project-level costings of CHO-led development from across Australia have been used to test the 
impacts of different funding and financing scenarios.  
Each investment pathway aims to be cost-neutral after 20 years. Five pathways have been 
modelled, to enable a comparison of the implications they have for government expenditure in 
terms of ongoing operating subsidies and Commonwealth Rent Assistance (CRA) payments. 
Overall, our modelling reveals that an NBC investment strategy is substantially more cost-
effective in the short and long term than a commercially financed model that is reliant on an 
operating subsidy to ensure affordable social tenancies. Indeed, privately financed and 
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subsidised strategies are 24 per cent more expensive in the first year alone, and these costs 
accumulate with each new tranche of privately financed dwellings, as shown in Table 1, below. 
Table 1: Comparison of five investment pathways 
Program 
Summary 
(Lifetime 
cost of Year 
1 of 
program) 
Scenario 1: 
Private 
financing 
with 
operating 
subsidy  
Scenario 2: 
NHFIC 
financing 
with 
operating 
subsidy 
Scenario 3: 
Upfront 
capital 
grant 
Scenario 4: 
Upfront 
capital 
grant + 
NHFIC 
financing 
Scenario 5: 
Larger 
capital 
grant + 
NHFIC, 
excluding 
cost of CRA 
Total 
development 
costs (excl. 
GST and 
taxes) 
 $7.0B  $6.4B $5.8B  $5.7B $5.4B 
Total 
operating 
costs 
 $2.8B  $2.8B $2.8B $2.8B $2.8B 
Rental 
income 
 $3.2B  $3.2B $3.2B $3.2B $3.2B 
Operating/ 
capital grant 
 $5.4B  $4.8B $4.2B $4.1B $5.0B  
CRA 
payments 
 $1.2B  $1.2B $1.2B  $1.2B   
Government 
subsidy 
 $6.6B  $6.0B  $5.4B  $5.3B $5.0B 
Savings on 
Scenario 1 
- 9% 18% 20% 24% 
Source: Lawson, Pawson et al. (2018). 
Under privately financed models, recurrent expenses continue for a considerably longer 
duration, fulfilling obligations to cumulative long-term financing contracts. As shown in Figure 2, 
a significant disadvantage of the operating subsidy model comes at the end of Year 20, when 
operating subsidies would still be required to be paid out on dwellings built in the later part of 
the program, unlike a capital grant model. 
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Figure 2: Annual expenditure under capital grant vs. operating subsidy programs 
Note: All values are represented as net present value (NPV) and do not include any costs associated with CRA 
payments. 
Source: Lawson, Pawson et al. (2018). 
Post Year 20, these ongoing recurrent expenses can place a considerable burden on public 
finances, constraining public investment in other priorities. Our Australian findings on the long-
term costs of private financing approaches share many similarities with the experience of the 
Private Finance Initiative (PFI) in the UK. There, the National Audit Office (NAO 2018) 
recommended curtailing the use of PFI, leading to the shift towards more direct public 
investment approaches. PFI was finally abolished in 2018 and the borrowing cap limiting local 
authority investment in social housing was gradually lifted to boost supply efforts. 
Upfront public equity investment is not only more cost-effective in the long term: unlike recurrent 
operating subsidies, it creates real value over time. This can be used and revolved to drive the 
achievement of policy goals, maximising locational advantages, setting decent building 
standards and driving innovation in (energy-efficient) design. Strategic public investment, 
carefully executed, can also attract and channel more efficient financing (such as NHFIC and 
the Clean Energy Finance Corporation—CEFC), building on recent Australian progress in 
mission-driven investment.  
Evaluating a long-term social housing investment program 
Cost-benefit analysis (CBA) is a method for program and policy analysis, founded in US welfare 
economics during the 1930s to justify spending on infrastructure (Berry 2017). It monetises the 
willingness to pay (WTP) for certain projects, to provide a quantifiable assessment of whether a 
project is of net benefit to society. In Australia, the most prominent use of CBA is in the 
assessment of major transport projects, guided by state and federal infrastructure bodies, as 
well as technical guidelines and parameters published by central agencies.  
Yet CBA should not be seen as the only basis for infrastructure decision-making. Recent 
developments in the transport sector, in particular, have been made on a political rather than 
technically quantified basis. It is also notable that other forms of social infrastructure, such as 
schools and hospitals, do not rely on positive CBAs to determine investments. Rather, non-
monetised, ethical considerations, such as need, distributional equity and environmental 
sustainability, come to the fore. This indicates that while CBA can provide numerical 
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reassurance to government of the net benefit to society of a project, other bases for advocacy 
are also influential in making decisions about infrastructure. 
While there has been recent interest in developing methodologies for applying CBA to social 
housing questions, methods remain underdeveloped in comparison to transport. There is no 
agreed approach to monetising the benefits of social housing. This reflects the long-term, 
multifaceted and interrelated benefits of social housing, many of which are regarded as 
‘intangible’ and too difficult to quantify in CBA studies reliant on the ‘rod of money’.  
The project appraisal methodology selected may influence outcomes and funding priorities. If 
CBA and business-case methodologies are to be relied upon for funding long-term social 
housing development programs, much work will need to be done to establish more suitable 
approaches than currently exist. These will need to address the gap in expertise and resources 
required to develop and implement CBA applicable to social housing, and provide the 
conceptual clarity, analytical guidance and rigour expected by decision makers. Appropriate 
longitudinal data also needs to be collected.  
Therefore, this Inquiry recommends two methodologies for the supporting appraisal of the 
proposed social housing development program. 
x An avoided costs methodology, which is a financial assessment of net savings to 
government of social housing provision due to lower frequency of use of health, justice and 
welfare services. 
x An economic analysis based on the equivalent private market rental value of social housing, 
predicated on the assumption that the rent represents the WTP for the bundle of goods 
provided by the housing (including security, social inclusion, health, access to services, 
amenity and wellbeing).  
These criteria reflect a pragmatic view of appraisal methodologies, based on efficacy, resource 
requirements and the need to provide support for a long-term social housing development now, 
rather than after years of subsequent research and data collection. These recommendations are 
made with an important caveat, included in the criteria listed above, that analytical methods and 
outcomes need to be accepted by decision makers and funding bodies. 
Policy development options 
Capital investment makes for a more effective pathway 
Reforming Australia’s social housing investment pathway to generate more productive 
outcomes must to be accompanied by a shift in the ways governments and key stakeholders 
talk and think about housing. Social housing’s contribution to social wellbeing, economic 
stability and sustainability requires a more central and firmly assured place in Australian public 
policy. A more ambitious and positive view of social housing can open up discursive space for 
the more technical requirements of changes to processes and institutions to gain traction. 
Social housing requires value-building, patient capital serving its stakeholders—not extractive 
financial innovation serving shareholders. Governments are placed in an ideal position to 
provide this, to ensure wider social benefits are achieved. Australian governments have used 
direct investment and long-term public loans very effectively in the past to lift the provision of 
public housing.  
Today’s governments would need to substantially increase investment in social housing to 
address the backlog and effect real change in housing outcomes. Direct equity investment will 
enable other patient investors, such as superannuation funds, to increase their useful role in 
providing more efficient financing for CHOs, investing in long-dated, government guaranteed 
NHFIC bonds.  
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Such reforms require not only awareness of the needs and costs of procurement but also the 
will to change the way Australian government prioritises infrastructure investment. It will require 
hard work to incorporate the pertinent metrics, covering the intangible and long-term benefits of 
social housing, in decision-making and assessment. Methods such as the ‘housing-adjusted life 
years’ approach show promise and have proven their value in public health economics. 
Thinking outside the envelope, and accounting for the avoided costs of homelessness, can also 
have traction in public expenditure deliberations.  
Governments can further develop the needs assessment and financial modelling tools 
presented in this report to measure and evaluate their community’s unmet need for social 
housing infrastructure. Additional qualitative work, involving social housing landlords and 
tenants, is required to examine these needs more sensitively. Consultation with industry is also 
required to determine appropriate cost benchmarks for procurement on the required scale. Such 
an effort necessitates greater commitment by all levels of Australian government to develop and 
implement long-term investment programs. This requires national leadership. 
To drive this effort, the Inquiry recommends the establishment of a national housing authority, 
operating under the guidance of a national housing strategy. A national housing authority could 
establish the level of funding required for state- and local-level efforts to develop needs based 
capital (NBC) investment programs to complement lower cost NHFIC financing. The outcome of 
this evidence base, state strategies and funding negotiations, would be National Housing 
Partnership Agreements with state governments, making use of NHFIC’s investment mandate 
to channel more efficient finance. The national housing authority could also have the capacity to 
guide and regulate organisations that make use of government subsidies for social housing 
provision, such as state housing authorities and CHOs. Such a strategy is outlined in Figure 3, 
below. 
Figure 3: Foundations of a national needs-based capital (NBC) investment strategy for 
social housing 
Source: Authors.  
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The Inquiry  
The Inquiry was undertaken in 2017–18 and involved three research teams, from RMIT 
University, The University of New South Wales (UNSW) and University of Tasmania (UTAS), 
and was co-ordinated by Dr Julie Lawson. It actively engaged with an Industry Panel 
throughout, which provided feedback discussion papers and research presentations, informing 
the peer-reviewed publication of three Research Reports and this Final Inquiry Report, as 
detailed in Table 2, below. 
Table 2: Research questions, methods and publications 
Research 
question 
What is the justification 
for defining social 
housing as 
infrastructure, 
alongside other forms 
of infrastructure? 
How can we best 
undertake a business 
case for social 
housing investment? 
What is the most 
effective investment 
pathway to deliver 
required housing 
outcomes? 
Methods x Review of national and 
international literature 
conceptualising social 
housing and infrastructure, 
contextualised by 
interviews with key 
international informants. 
x Interviews with 19 policy-
makers (Commonwealth, 
Victoria, NSW) focussed 
on potential overlaps 
between housing and 
infrastructure policy. 
x Critical policy analysis 
(derived from Bacchi 2009) 
examining meanings 
currently attached to social 
housing and infrastructure, 
opportunities for 
reconfiguring and 
reimagining those 
meanings, and 
implications for policy. 
x Review of policy, 
guidelines and 
commentary on 
infrastructure business 
case preparation in 
Australia.  
x Review of selection of 
business cases for 
recent major 
infrastructure projects. 
x Interviews with 18 
stakeholders in 
industry, government 
and academia to test 
potential future 
approaches and 
methods to the 
application of CBA to 
social housing. 
x Review of national and 
international literature on 
needs assessment 
methodology and 
infrastructure investment 
pathways. 
x Interviews with 20 
stakeholders and two half-
day industry workshops 
(with Clean Energy 
Finance Corporation and 
NSW Federation of 
Housing Associations CFO 
group).  
x Development of 
demographic model of 
level and distribution of 
social housing need over 
20 years, and associated 
cost of procurement based 
on real project costs.  
x Development of evaluation 
framework assessing the 
effectiveness, equity and 
efficiency of alternative 
funding and financing 
scenarios, supported by 
financial modelling of cost 
to government (using 
UNSW’s Affordable 
Housing Assessment 
Tool). 
Publication Flanagan, K., Martin, C., 
Jacobs, K. and Lawson, 
J. (2019) A conceptual 
analysis of social housing 
as infrastructure, Final 
Report No. 309, AHURI, 
Melbourne 
Denham, T., Dodson, 
J and Lawson, J. 
(2019), The business 
case for social housing 
as infrastructure, Final 
Report No. 312, 
AHURI, Melbourne 
Lawson, J., Pawson, H., 
Troy, L., Van den 
Nouwelant, R. and 
Hamilton, C. (2018) Social 
housing as infrastructure: 
an investment pathway, 
Final Report No. 306, 
AHURI, Melbourne 
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Research 
question 
What is the justification 
for defining social 
housing as 
infrastructure, 
alongside other forms 
of infrastructure? 
How can we best 
undertake a business 
case for social 
housing investment? 
What is the most 
effective investment 
pathway to deliver 
required housing 
outcomes? 
Final Inquiry 
Report 
Lawson, J., Denham, T., Dodson, D., Flanagan, K., Jacobs, K., Martin, C., Van 
den Nouwelant, R., Pawson, H. and Troy, L (2019) Social Housing as 
Infrastructure: rationale, prioritisation and investment pathway, Final Report No. 
315, AHURI, Melbourne 
Source: Authors. 
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1 Introduction 
Usually conceptualised as referring to physical assets such as roads, water and 
power supplies, the term ‘infrastructure’ can be—as this report argues—reasonably 
applied to a wider range of social and economic amenities that are fundamental to 
inclusive, productive and sustainable cities.  
With good planning and adequate investment, such infrastructure contributes 
towards social equity, stable economic growth and environmental sustainability, 
and also delivers equitable, effective and efficient services. 
Treating social housing as a component of infrastructure means it can be aligned 
with developments in infrastructure policy more broadly, including shifts towards 
greater transparency and efficiency.  
This research uses a variety of qualitative and quantitative methods to inform the 
development of a social housing investment pathway from the perspective of needs-
based social infrastructure.  
Urban development, and the social and economic opportunities it provides, is underpinned by 
investment in infrastructure. To meet the needs of a growing population and ensure more 
inclusive and sustainable living environments for the future, this entails investment not only in 
transport infrastructure, but many other beneficial assets such as parks, schools, hospitals and 
social housing. How social infrastructure—including secure affordable accommodation for low-
income households—is delivered depends on our willingness to prioritise and fund it. 
This Inquiry examined approaches to investment in social housing from this perspective of 
infrastructure. Understood in this way, social housing can be aligned with developments in 
infrastructure policy more broadly, including shifts towards greater transparency and efficiency 
in project appraisal and funding prioritisation, as well as emerging financing, development and 
operating structures.  
The three main research questions addressed by this Inquiry are as follows. 
1 What is the justification for defining social housing as infrastructure, alongside other forms of 
infrastructure?  
2 How can we best undertake a business case for social housing investment?  
3 What is the most effective investment pathway to deliver the required housing outcomes? 
1.1 Policy context  
Between 1951 and 1996, Australian states and territories built 8,000 to 14,000 social housing 
dwellings each year (Troy 2012). These building programs were funded through direct public 
investment, via conditional grants and long-term loans. Since the 1990s, however, social 
housing construction levels have languished at residual levels, apart from a short-lived revival 
immediately following the GFC via the Social Housing Initiative (SHI) (Groenhart and Burke 
2014: 12). While Australia’s total number of households expanded by 30 per cent over the two 
decades to 2016, social housing provision grew by just 4 per cent (calculated from Yates 2013; 
ABS 2015; SCRGSP 2016). 
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Since the 1990s, Australian housing assistance has been directed away from capital investment 
in accommodation assets. Instead, public funds have been provided to individuals as indirect 
subsidies via the tax system, and as direct assistance through first home owner grants and rent 
assistance (Jacobs, Atkinson et al. 2010; Groenhart and Burke 2014). This shift has been 
championed as the most efficient way to target public resources (Productivity Commission 
2016) and reduce public debt. Closer analysis reveals the inequity and unintended 
consequences of a demand-focussed investment orientated approach (Groenhart 2014).  
Highly competitive demand of the rental accommodation in the context of low vacancy rates and 
weak rent regulation, has led to the majority of tenants (52.9%) paying more than 30 per cent of 
their incomes in rent. To assist with excessive housing costs, private tenants receiving 
Commonwealth pensions can receive Commonwealth Rent Assistance (CRA). Their number 
has grown to 1.3 million income units in 2017–2018, costing the budget $4.43 billion that year 
(Tables GA6 and GA7, Productivity Commission, 2019). While CRA assists a large proportion 
(68.3%) of recipients to meet their housing costs, this support is not sufficient to address 
housing affordability stress amongst a substantial 40.3 per cent of recipients (Productivity 
Commission, 2019). Further, CRA does not assist public housing tenants. Their rents are 
geared to their often very low incomes. The cost of public housing are supported by National 
Affordable Housing Special Purpose Payments, but the amount of this support has declined by 
8 per cent from 2013 to 2018 ($1.3 billion in 2013 in real terms).  
Notably, payments via intergovernmental agreements such as NAHA or NHHA are not clearly 
tied to expenditure on capital assets or operating costs. While supply targets are now specified 
in new NHHA bi-lateral agreements (e.g. between the Commonwealth and Victorian 
Government), these could be linked much more effectively to local needs analyses, to better 
inform the level of budgetary resources required, real expenditure, outcomes generated and 
budget reporting. While improvements to supply targets have been made for social housing, no 
such scrutiny has been imposed on the generous levels of indirect assistance provided via the 
tax system to housing investors. As negative gearing provisions and capital gains tax 
exemptions erode government revenues, the social benefits of these implicit subsidies are 
regressive (Duncan, Hodgson et al, 2018).2 
Starved of direct capital investment, state housing authorities serving those in urgent need of 
housing, have turned to extracting the accumulated value stored in existing public housing 
assets and attracting private investment in an effort to renew their deteriorating assets and 
create new ones. The outcome of this effort is often a range of ‘affordable’ products rather than 
targeted on increasing social housing stock (Randolph, Troy et al. 2018).3 
Heads of Treasury have been advised of this funding gap by the Commonwealth’s Affordable 
Housing Working Group (AHWG 2017). According to the most recent Productivity Commission 
Report (2019) the number of public housing households has decreased over the last decade 
from 328,736 in 2009 to 304,532 in 2018. There has been some growth over the same period of 
‘affordable’ rental in the community housing sector, largely through cash payments under the 
National Rental Affordability Scheme (NRAS) and the transfer of public housing management, 
as well as new social housing funded by direct public investment under the Social Housing 
Initiative. Both NRAS and SHI investment have ceased. Consequently, real growth has slowed 
                                               
 
2 According to detailed AHURI research “Negatively geared investors who receive the highest tax savings are 
typically middle-aged fulltime employed males. On the other hand, the ones who benefit the least are females 
and older investors aged 55+ years who are not in the labour force. Home-owner investors who own both a 
family home and at least one rental investment property received the greatest CGT discount benefits, while 
renters who do not own properties do not receive any CGT discount.” (Duncan et al, 2018:2) 
3 The NSW Government’s 2016 Social and Affordable Housing Fund (SAHF) is a notable exception, designating 
75% of procured dwellings as social housing (Pawson and Milligan 2015). 
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(other than that aided by stock transfers) (Productivity Commission, 2019), and is declining 
relative to both overall household growth and estimated need. In a recent turnaround in funding, 
the Queensland Government has announced major direct capital investment in social and 
affordable housing (de Brenni 2018). 
Some governments have privatised their social housing stock. As institutional investors, such as 
pension funds and private equity funds seek returns, these assets and their rent rolls have 
attracted growing interest. For some investors, the availability of government-provided ‘match 
funding’ or concession payments makes such investments even more attractive. This motivated 
the growth of concession-based Private Finance Initiative (PFI) infrastructure contracts in the 
UK, enabled by a wave of privatisations of government services. In Germany, private equity and 
hedge funds, such as Fortress Investment Group and Blackstone, purchased discounted social 
housing stocks following the Sovereign Debt Crisis, fuelling the creation of global corporate 
landlords with more active asset management strategies (commercialisation of rents, capital 
value extraction, debt loading). The Vonovia property company is now the largest landlord in 
Europe, with over 370,000 dwellings (Aalbers, Van Loon et al. 2017; Vonovia 2015).  
There are real questions to be raised as to whether this approach is either cost-effective for 
governments or beneficial for tenants in both the short and long term. Clearly, a critical re-
assessment of the current approach to housing assistance and investment strategies is required 
if Australia’s stock of social housing is to be maintained and increased. This Inquiry seeks to 
inform policy-makers about the merits and pitfalls of reconceptualising social housing as a form 
of infrastructure.  
1.2 Existing research  
Social housing was once a recipient of government investment, aimed at addressing housing 
market failure but also achieving outcomes in the areas of economic growth, national 
development, public health and social cohesion. Today, as measured by the size of its waiting 
list and length of waiting times, the social housing system is failing to meet these broader 
objectives and directly address growing need (SCRGSP 2018; AIHW 2018). Academics, 
advocates and policy-makers have argued that this failure is due to inadequate funding, short-
term policy, and costly private finance arrangements (Lawson, Berry et al. 2009; 2014).  
In this context, it has been suggested that reconceptualising social housing as a form of 
essential infrastructure might help to unlock investment, especially from non-government 
sources, for increasing social housing supply (see Australian Government 2014; AHURI 2016). 
There is scope within existing conceptualisations of both social housing and infrastructure to 
allow for this, and social housing features in some infrastructure typologies alongside the 
provision of hospitals, schools and prisons (e.g. Productivity Commission 2014; Infrastructure 
Victoria 2016). More broadly, there is space within recent political statements on infrastructure 
to include social housing (see, for example, Taylor 2017). However, to date there is little 
evidence that this association between social housing and infrastructure has directly shaped 
practice or resulted in meaningful additional investment. 
1.2.1 Measuring the contribution of social housing  
Governments and the private sector use business case and cost-benefit analysis (CBA) to 
appraise infrastructure investment proposals. A business case sets out the purpose, costs, 
benefits and risks associated with a project, based on financial, economic and strategic 
assessments. Infrastructure business case processes have been refined over recent decades, 
and are adopted by a range of public and private sector organisations. CBA is used to quantify 
the net benefits that result from an initiative, and generates the benefit-cost ratio and net 
present value that are central to assessment outcomes.  
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While there is an extensive literature on the benefits associated with adequate housing—and 
social housing—provision, there are few examples of CBA application or the monetisation of 
benefits as normally required in CBA. This is most likely due to the difficulty of quantifying and 
monetising the range of non-market traded benefits that accrue from social housing, such as 
wellbeing, participation in education and social inclusion. As Pugh and Catt (1984: 28) explain: 
It is relatively uncontroversial to specify the capital and current costs of housing 
programmes. But it is more difficult to find widespread agreement on the way the 
benefits should be reasoned, measured, and enumerated. The challenges associated 
with quantifying non-monetary outcomes is probably a reason why CBA is not widely 
used for assessing other variants of social infrastructure, such as health and 
education, where decisions are made on the basis of need, demography and funding 
agreements between the Commonwealth and States.  
The limited examples that do exist include CBAs undertaken for the South Australian Housing 
Trust (Pugh and Catt 1984) and the New South Wales Department of Housing (Carter, Milligan 
and Hall 1988) in the 1980s. The background for both these studies was the transition of the 
social housing system to a residualised, safety-net model (Spiller 2017). Both studies found that 
the benefits of social housing could be calculated by comparing public and private market rents, 
although they used different assumptions and applications. Pugh and Catt (1984) adapted a 
method developed by DeSalvo (1971), where benefits are a function of estimated market rents, 
actual rent paid in social housing, rent-income ratios of people not in social housing, and the 
income of the tenant.  
A 1989 report by Econsult compared rental assistance and housing provision using cost-
effectiveness analysis, based on the questionable assumption that both options provide ‘secure 
and affordable housing to low income persons’ (Econsult 1989: 1). The report found that, over a 
12- to 15-year time frame, housing provision was more cost-effective than rental assistance. 
The central discount rate used in the analysis was 3 per cent, with sensitivity testing at 0 per 
cent and 5 per cent. The justifications for this were: imperfect capital markets and their failure to 
account for externalities; private capital having comparatively low regard for future generations; 
taxation liabilities for private investment; and lower risk for public projects (Econsult 1989: 23–
4).  
Econsult’s work informed the 1993 report on public housing by the Industry Commission. The 
Commission (1993: 66–7) found that in the long run it is cheaper for governments to directly 
increase supply than to stimulate additional supply through vouchers or allowances4, because 
additional rents resulting from the vouchers or allowances must also be paid to the existing 
landlords. Government retention of social housing stock was also seen as beneficial as it 
provided a hedge against housing market fluctuations and mitigated private landlord 
discrimination against prospective social housing tenants. However, in recent years the 
Productivity Commission (2017) has focussed on efficiency within the social housing sector, 
emphasising the need for competition, contestability and user choice, and advocated more 
market-based methods of providing housing assistance, such as rental assistance, over directly 
increasing social housing supply. Less attention has been given to the inequity of Australian 
housing assistance across the wider housing system (Groenhart 2014). A focus on equity and 
effectiveness would inevitably highlight the constrained resources devoted to social housing.  
                                               
 
4 The issue of supply versus demand-side subsidies is discussed in more detail in Lawson, Pawson et al. 2018, 
especially section 3.5.1. Australia spends relatively little on direct investment, and lack of investment in supply is 
considered by the social housing industry to be one of the greatest barriers limiting growth (Lawson, Pawson et 
al. 2018: 41–42). 
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A number of approaches to assessing the broader economic benefits of social housing have 
been applied by researchers in the past decade. Ravi and Reinhardt (2011) used social return 
on investment (SROI) methods to evaluate the benefits of community housing in Australia. 
Kraatz and Thomson (2016) collected an evidence base of the benefits of social housing to 
construct a ‘composite return on investment’—including SROI, wellbeing valuation, value to the 
individual and the value of equity—as ‘a single method does not capture the complex nature of 
the value returned to society and the individual of having access to safe and secure housing’ 
(Kraatz and Thomson 2016: 24).  
The purpose of the composite return on investment measure is similar to the intent of the 
framework described in this report: ‘to establish a robust methodology for valuing the return on 
investment of providing social housing, in order to build the case for on-going investment’ 
(Kraatz and Thomson 2016: 24). However, implementation of this framework is different. Witte 
(2017) found that for every $1 invested in last-resort housing, $2.70 of benefits are generated 
over the subsequent 20-year period, including health cost savings, improved quality of life, 
reduced crime costs (both as victim and perpetrator), increased human capital, avoided 
property blight and nuisance, volunteering, and economies of scale and scope. However, as 
‘last-resort’ housing is for short-term emergency relief, helping people transition into longer-term 
secure tenancies, it does not account for the additional benefits associated with secure tenure.  
These detailed investigations of social housing’s economic benefits provide valuable insights for 
investment decisions, but for a CBA of social housing their methods are not directly 
transferable. While SROI draws on CBA theory and techniques, it is not recommended for use 
in comparisons of different programs and with different stakeholders (Maier, Schober et al. 
2015). The summation of itemised benefits technique employed by Kraatz and Thomson (2016) 
introduces the risk of the double counting of benefits (by including separate measures for 
employment and education, for example) and does not provide a single monetised estimate for 
use in calculating net present value or benefit-cost analysis.  
To address some of the concerns with SROI in particular, Alliance Social Enterprises5 
developed the Australian Social Value Bank (ASVB), to be used as a tool for undertaking CBA 
of social infrastructure programs within Australia. The ASVB is a social value calculator, based 
on the ‘wellbeing valuation’ methodology, considering 62 different social measures, broadly 
categorised as: health, home, education, social and community, drugs and alcohol, crime and 
employment. Wellbeing valuation calculates changes in peoples’ circumstances and then 
assumes that these changes will result in increased income to monetise the improvements. 
Secondary benefits are also included, such as reduced welfare payments and increased tax 
receipts. The ASVB benefit calculation method reduces the propensity for double counting by 
limiting the number of benefits included to three, with explicit warnings included in the guide 
(Fujiwara, Keohane et al. 2017: 19). This method can be seen as a step towards the 
development of a standardised set of parameters for evaluating social infrastructure programs, 
akin to those published by the Australian Transport Council (2006) for the assessment of 
transport infrastructure proposals.  
1.2.2 Options for investment 
A review of international and national experience in social infrastructure provision undertaken 
for this Inquiry revealed that the contribution of social housing to overall economic development 
and social wellbeing varies considerably according to its core purpose: as an instrument of 
welfare, a market stabiliser, or to progress broader social, economic and environmental goals. 
Like Australia, the UK and US have narrowed the role of their social housing sectors to one of 
                                               
 
5 https://asvb.com.au 
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addressing only urgent housing needs. In contrast, countries as diverse as China, Singapore, 
Finland and Austria pursue a much broader set of goals. There, social housing is perceived as 
promoting sustainable and stable housing markets, ensuring efficient housing supply outcomes 
and promoting economic productivity. Austria and Finland also use direct investment social 
housing to promote more inclusive and energy-efficient housing options (Chen, Stephens et al. 
2013; Lawson and Milligan 2008). 
Australia often draws policy inspiration from anglophone countries such as the US and the UK, 
where the level of public investment in infrastructure has declined relative to recurrent 
expenditure assistance (Housing Vouchers and Housing Benefit respectively). These 
governments have relied on private financing, funded in part by operating subsidies and rising 
consumer charges (Chen, Stephens et al. 2013; NAO 2013, 2015, 2018b; NHF 2017). Policies 
prioritising competition, choice and private investment in the UK, US and Australia have driven 
changes in the financing, construction and charging policies of infrastructure projects and 
services such as schools, hospitals and prisons. This trend also affects social housing and, 
most notably in the UK, there is heavy reliance on private investment—supported by rising rents 
(due to inflation) and underpinned by deep housing allowances—to address declining public 
capital investment in social housing (Williams and Whitehead 2015). To illustrate, the proportion 
of housing assistance spent on housing allowances in the European Union (EU) rose from 
54 per cent to 75 per cent between 2009 and 2015, with the highest share (85%) in the UK 
(NHF 2017). In contrast, total expenditure on housing development in the EU has declined by 
44 per cent, from €48.2 billion in 2009 to €27.5 billion in 2015.  
This decline in capital investment and rapid growth in rent subsidies has indirectly contributed to 
a shortage of accessible affordable rental housing in major European cities—with notable 
exceptions in Austria and Finland. As we discuss later in the paper, there is a need for a more 
accurate depiction of the subsidies underpinning housing supply and consumption, and their 
equity and effectiveness, so that policy reforms are better equipped to address challenging and 
dynamic market circumstances. 
1.3 Research methods  
This Inquiry establishes the policy rationale for defining social housing as infrastructure, 
provides a business case for funding and financing it, and recommends an appropriate 
investment pathway. It is informed by analysis of national and international argumentation, 
current barriers and emerging financing pathways, and provides demographic and financial 
modelling of the need for social housing, the cost of procuring it, and the impact of different 
funding and financing strategies on the costs to government. A more detailed overview of the 
methods used is provided in Table 3, below. 
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2 Recognising social housing as essential social 
infrastructure 
Key points 
Social housing is a form of spatially fixed, materially realised capital expenditure 
that supports social objectives in areas like public health and economic 
development, and compensates for inequities and inefficiencies in the housing 
market. It can therefore be conceptualised as essential social infrastructure that 
warrants public investment.  
However, political will remains the determinant of the level of that investment. In 
mobilising political will to increase the level of investment in social housing, the 
following are critical considerations. 
x Social housing providers could make more effective use of infrastructure policy 
tools (like CBA) to mount a business case for investment, but these tools and 
their associated conceptual frameworks may implicitly limit the scope of 
intervention. 
x In cases of market failure, direct intervention by government is accepted as 
necessary and appropriate. However, conventional understandings of ‘market 
failure’ are too narrow to encompass the extent of housing market dysfunction in 
Australia or the positive role that could be played by governments in addressing 
housing need. 
x Decision-making on social housing investment is affected by a perception that 
governments are naturally and inevitably financially constrained. This 
perception lends credence to claims that the goal of a budget surplus is the most 
important objective of government. The valorisation of a budget surplus 
undermines welfare objectives like health, housing and education. 
x Social housing historically has made a significant contribution to Australian 
society by providing accommodation for working households and thereby 
supporting economic development. There is a strong contemporary case for it to 
be supported to make this kind of contribution again, and at a level that could 
ameliorate inequalities that surface in the broader housing market. 
2.1 Social housing is infrastructure 
Within the literature, ‘infrastructure’ is conceptualised as both a special type of object and a field 
of practice (e.g. Chong and Poole 2013; OECD 2002; Dodson 2009, 2017; O’Neill 2017).  
x As an object, the term refers to large-scale, spatially fixed public works that support or 
enable economic or social functions, in cases where externalities are diffuse and adequate 
private investment consequently less likely.  
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x As a field of practice, infrastructure involves diverse actors, discourses and practices. One 
result of the recent ‘infrastructure turn’ is consolidation of this field, with statutory 
infrastructure agencies established in Australia and elsewhere to promote decision-making 
about investment.  
The 19 stakeholders interviewed for this research espoused understandings of infrastructure 
consistent with the approach taken in the literature, but they put greater emphasis on economic 
or productivity gains as outcomes of infrastructure. These stakeholders were primarily senior 
officers in government departments (Treasury, infrastructure and social housing agencies) and 
statutory infrastructure authorities, while three were working as consultants or in the industry (for 
further detail, see Flanagan, Martin et al. 2019). Their views provided evidence of current 
understandings within government of social housing and infrastructure policy and their potential 
areas of overlap. Alongside the findings of the literature and policy review, the transcripts of 
these interviews served as the material for a detailed critical policy analysis, which aimed to 
problematise and critique their underlying assumptions (see Bacchi 2009: Table 3). 
There is a strong historical precedent in Australia and elsewhere for conceptualising social 
housing as essential infrastructure that enables industrial development, better public health, and 
security for working-class households (Troy 2012). There are also recent international 
precedents for using social housing investment to achieve policy goals in energy efficiency and 
urban cohesion (Flanagan, Martin et al. 2019: 35–39). However, in Australia this broader 
contribution of social housing has been eroded by a set of policy positions that can be grouped 
under the label of neo-liberalism. Neo-liberalism varies in its manifestations but generally 
incorporates measures to wind back government intervention in favour of free-market 
mechanisms, through limiting government regulation, public provision of goods and services, 
cutting taxes and reducing or at least containing social welfare expenditure (Berry 2014). As 
neo-liberal values have become normalised, policy-makers, including those interviewed for this 
research, have come to perceive social housing as safety-net or welfare housing: heavily 
subsidised, tightly targeted and associated with the need for additional social services to 
manage tenants’ multiple and complex support needs.  
Despite this, there is still conceptual common ground between infrastructure and social housing: 
both are a form of subsidised provision enabling delivery of an outcome, and social housing is 
increasingly on the agenda for statutory infrastructure agencies. For example, one informant 
stated: 
I do think it’s infrastructure. I think it’s a valuable asset stock, and when we build it 
we’re building [something] that makes society work. 
One of the hoped-for consequences, and therefore key justifications, of reconceptualising social 
housing as infrastructure is that the sector will become a more attractive destination for private 
investment (AHURI 2016: 5). The desire for private finance to resolve the problem of 
underinvestment in the social housing system arises in part because public investment is 
perceived to be unavailable or undesirable, or both. Yet even if private finance were 
forthcoming, this would not negate the need for a public subsidy to fill the ‘funding gap’ (see 
Section 3.6). The principal institutional barrier to adequate investment in the social housing 
system is therefore not the lack of private investment, but the political economy of government 
decision-making. 
Any additional public funding for social housing would need to be allocated through the 
competitive government budget process. In the recent past, it has proved extremely difficult for 
housing agencies to successfully argue the case for giving priority to expenditure on social 
housing—as one interviewee described it, social housing is ‘fighting it out with education 
services, health services, roads, maintaining roads and subsidising rail tickets’. The requirement 
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to find internal ‘cost offsets’ for any new expenditure adds another pressure in human services 
departments, where housing is frequently co-located with other areas of significant social need. 
None of these conventions are inevitable. It is possible for governments to allocate substantial 
new funding to areas of significant social need if they choose to do so. Political will is 
therefore the critical factor in determining the level of investment in social housing. 
Treating social housing as a form of infrastructure can be advantageous, as it gives policy-
makers and advocates access to different processes and ideas than those that currently 
dominate social housing policy and practice. However, as both informants and members of the 
Inquiry Panel made clear, on its own, the claim that social housing is a form of infrastructure is 
not enough to make the case for a new approach. In mobilising the necessary commitment to 
overcome the current lack of political will to sufficiently resource the social housing system, 
other factors need to be considered. They include the processes involved in building the case 
for social housing and the beneficial role that a properly resourced social housing system could 
play in Australian society.  
2.2 Building the case for social housing 
2.2.1 Quantifying the benefits 
Policy-makers interviewed for this research argued that social housing providers needed to 
make more effective use of techniques employed in infrastructure policy, such as CBA. They 
considered that being able to present a credible, costed business case for investment in social 
housing—one in which the contribution of social housing to meeting social and economic 
objectives, and the value of providing it relative to the cost, was clearly and rigorously 
articulated—would strengthen arguments in favour of investment. They also suggested that 
exploiting such techniques might give social housing providers access to previously 
inaccessible funding pathways, such as those available for other forms of infrastructure. For 
example, one informant stated: 
One of the things that we’ve worked on here is looking at what are the economic and 
social benefits of providing social housing? Trying to cost them not just on 
improvements in health and education but what it means in terms of infrastructure, as 
a way of discussing these with Treasury to say, well actually, there are flow-on 
benefits. 
However, identifying, quantifying and costing the ‘outcomes’ of housing assistance is a complex 
undertaking (see Chapter 3). In current infrastructure practice, greatest weight is given to 
assessments of value and risk derived from private market pricing; in a conventional cost-
benefit analysis, service delivery must be measured and expressed in quantified, monetised 
form. This emphasis could lead to the values, aspirations and qualities central to the work of 
social housing providers and the experiences of tenants being downplayed, obscured or 
excluded, inadvertently negating one of the principal advantages of conceptualising social 
housing as a form of infrastructure—that is, the capacity to recognise and build upon the 
broader social, cultural and economic role that could be occupied by an appropriately resourced 
social housing system. Some informants drew attention to these kinds of risks, for example: 
’Cause it’ll pigeonhole it into private investment, ’cause that’s what infrastructure does 
… and yeah, you’ll kind of lose some of the argument for investment because we stop 
talking about people’s lives and start talking about the asset, like the bricks and 
mortar. 
Informants provided little if any concrete evidence to support the suggestion that a lack of CBA-
style assessment had prevented investment in social housing or that wholesale adoption of it 
would increase investment. However, it was clear from the interviews that there is an increasing 
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interest within government in using this kind of analysis to underpin decisions about social 
policy expenditure, and that adoption of such an approach would give greater legitimacy to 
claims for additional funds. 
2.2.2 Building from market failure 
One of the key reasons for the establishment of the post-war Australian public housing system 
was the recognition that ‘private enterprise, the world over, has not adequately and hygienically 
housed the low-income group’ (CHC 1944: 24), and that this had contributed to the shortage of 
reasonable accommodation for workers across the country, and significant issues with 
substandard, insanitary housing in particular (see also Troy 2012; Martin 2018). For policy-
makers of the time, the most appropriate response to the crisis (Dufty-Jones 2018) was direct 
government involvement in the provision of decent, affordable housing for lower-income groups 
(CHC 1944: 17–18, 24–25). The work of the new public housing authorities was part of a 
broader economic program, in that public investment in economic and social infrastructure, 
including housing, was integral to Keynesian economics (Chick and Tily 2014). 
Under neo-liberalism, levels of public investment in infrastructure, including social housing, have 
fallen, while public infrastructure monopolies have been restructured to become private 
infrastructure markets. The conventional interpretation of economic theory is that markets are 
more efficient than governments at allocating goods and services, but that where circumstances 
prevent, distort or inhibit the efficient operation of markets—where the market has ‘failed’—it is 
legitimate for governments to intervene. It is increasingly evident that in Australia the private 
housing market is not meeting the needs of a growing proportion of Australian households in the 
absence of—and sometimes in spite of—subsidies and incentives from government (National 
Welfare Rights Network 2014; Parkinson and Parsell 2018). 
Some researchers have argued that the notion of ‘market failure’ can constrain government 
action rather than promote it. Kattel, Mazzucato and colleagues (2018) argue that the concept 
rests on the false assumption that an ideal or perfect market can and does exist. Situations 
where there is ‘imperfect’ access to information, for example, is presented in the theoretical 
literature as one of the four traditional forms of market failure, which implies it is an exceptional 
circumstance that occurs rarely—but in the ‘real’ world, the quality, availability and accessibility 
of information is almost always imperfect (Kattel, Mazzucato et al. 2018: 5). Edwards (2007: 
127–140) argues that the conventional definition of market failure is misaligned with deeply 
embedded Australian cultural norms and values. She calls for an expanded definition of market 
failure that incorporates ‘quality of life’, arguing that ‘[h]ow we organise our economy lies at the 
heart of our quality of life’ (130). Such an expanded understanding of market failure would take 
account of the importance of social connection, and the capacity for all people, whether they are 
in paid employment or not, to make a meaningful contribution to others. It would also recognise 
the social costs to individuals and communities of excessively long, inflexible or unpredictable 
working hours. A similar vision was expressed in 1944 by the Commonwealth Housing 
Commission, which argued that public housing provision would lead ‘the people to a fuller social 
life and a fuller exercise of the rights of the citizenship’ (CHC 1944: 67).  
There is significant consensus on the existence of market failure in the Australian housing 
system. For policy-makers interviewed for this research, this failure was ample justification for 
Australian governments to intervene in the housing market to ensure all households have 
access to affordable and appropriate shelter. Because of this consensus, the concept of ‘market 
failure’ provides a pragmatic starting point for a necessary policy discussion about the future 
role of government in the Australian housing system. Within that discussion, the alternative 
perspectives available from the academic critique of market failure could be used to facilitate 
the development of more innovative responses. An expanded understanding of what constitutes 
market failure (see Edwards 2007) can function as a platform for redefining the role, size and 
form of the social housing system. Rather than just ‘levelling the playing field’, governments can 
AHURI Final Report No. 315 22 
use social housing investment to ‘shape [housing] markets and direct economic activity in 
socially desirable directions … to achieve publicly accepted outcomes’ (Kattel, Mazzucato et al. 
2018: 6).  
2.2.3 Tackling perceptions of budget constraint 
Infrastructure discourse distinguishes between ‘financing’ and ‘funding’: the former refers to the 
provision of money for the construction and operation of an infrastructure asset; while the latter 
means the way in which the costs of financing, such as interest charges, will be paid (see 
Flanagan, Martin et al. 2019: 27). Funding can be provided by user charges, but in the case of 
social housing, where the very low incomes of tenants severely restrict their capacity to pay, the 
only feasible source is a payment from government. Yet, as noted above, expenditure decisions 
by governments are underpinned by an assumption that there are natural, inevitable constraints 
on government spending. For example, the Australian Government’s Infrastructure Finance 
Working Group suggests that: 
a major constraint on the delivery of social and economic infrastructure is the funding 
capacity of Australian governments. This is distinct from the capacity of the private 
sector to provide financing capital for infrastructure projects … Under current 
arrangements, governments do not have sufficient headroom on their budgets to fund 
the level of infrastructure required (2012: v. 1). 
Or, as one of the policy-makers interviewed for this research put it, ‘the reality is, governments 
have to live within their means’. The choice of the word ‘reality’ here is significant—it indicates 
the extent to which a perception of constraint has become accepted fact.  
In Australia, the belief in constraint is closely associated with bipartisan commitment to the 
importance of budget surpluses and distaste for government debt. This approach to fiscal policy 
has ‘conditioned’ public discourse, with ‘deficits and debt linked to the mismanagement of public 
expenditure’ (Brenton and Pierre 2017: 658). It has also been written into the processes of 
government, such as through the institution of forward estimates. These act to ‘lock-in’ the 
projected expenditure, which makes later changes, especially those involving new spending, 
less achievable (Brenton and Pierre 2017: 564). Requests for new spending are handled 
through a competitive process in which the convention is that increases in one area must be 
met by corresponding reductions in others. An informant described the central dilemma as 
follows: 
I think if you ask most people, do they think we should have it [social housing], I think 
the answer would be yes. Is it valuable? Yes. Should we spend money on that rather 
than something else? I think that’s when the problem arises. 
To attain adequate resources for social housing, these orthodoxies and perceptions, and the 
politics that underpin them, need to be tackled. At present, the allowable option for government 
faced with multiple, competing needs is to fund what it can, and leave the rest unfunded. There 
are of course alternative approaches, which would allow the role of government to be widened 
to one in which governments fund what is necessary for the public good. These include: 
reforming current revenue-raising instruments and directing savings to deliver greatest social 
outcomes; strategic investment of public equity or debt to drive supply and innovation 
outcomes; and more cost-effective fund raising via a public infrastructure bank, monetary 
financing or similar. 
2.3 A broader role for social housing 
Historically in Australia social housing was infrastructure. The size and nature of the post-war 
building program, and the way it was described and explained within policy, made it clear that 
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government provision of decent and affordable housing for low-income households was part of 
a broader agenda of economic development and social equity. The housing program was a core 
responsibility of government.  
This status has been weakened in recent decades. Since the 1970s there has been substantial 
economic change on a global scale. In Australia, this has led to high rates of unemployment and 
underemployment (especially among the traditional ‘blue-collar’ working class), putting pressure 
on the welfare safety net and leading to the emergence of geographical, social and increasingly 
intergenerational patterns of poverty and disadvantage. These patterns of inequality are 
arguably most evident in the Australian housing market. As part of the reaction to economic 
change, there has also been an identifiable ideological shift within government, and this has led 
to altered understandings of the role of government and the merits of some kinds of government 
spending (Jacobs, Atkinson et al. 2010). The consequences for the social housing system have 
included continued reductions in funding, stringent targeting to need, and an increasingly 
stigmatised reputation (Atkinson and Jacobs 2008).  
Currently, social housing is a rationed resource. As some interviewees pointed out, at its current 
scale, even operating with perfect efficiency, the system would be incapable of housing every 
household currently both eligible and in urgent need. If governments decided to direct funds at 
increasing the number of households that could be accommodated, at what point would that 
investment be ‘enough’? The following exchange illustrates this point: 
Interviewee: [What is the] aspirational growth ambition for the sector … because it 
would take an extraordinary change in circumstances for them to be able to absorb all 
those people who now aspire to be in there—in social housing. 
Researcher: Yeah, it’d almost be sort of post-war building program kind of—  
Interviewee: And you know that’s not going to happen. Not going to happen. So where 
does that leave us realistically as to who we should focus on, what our goals should 
be, what is realistic success? 
The answer to this question depends on the way in which the ‘problem’ is defined. A policy 
restricting social housing to the very, very poor and disadvantaged, or households with 
‘complex’ needs, identifies the ‘problem’ as confined to this group. Yet housing market failure in 
Australia is arguably broader than this, extending to low-paid workers living in locations where 
rents are high, supply is low, or both; low-income retirees or age pensioners living in the private 
rental market; single people; ‘key workers’ whose incomes are insufficient for them to live within 
a reasonable distance of their place of work; young people trying to establish themselves in 
independent housing; and people experiencing changes in income or housing need due to 
illness, unemployment or a relationship breakdown. For the growing numbers of households 
living for extended periods in the private rental market, a systemic lack of tenure security affects 
workforce and educational engagement and social cohesion, and imposes additional and 
significant transactional costs. Ordinary housing market processes do not respond to these 
needs. Research indicates that new housing supply is weighted towards higher priced rather 
than more affordable housing, even though there is sustained demand for the latter (Ong, 
Dalton et al. 2017).  
Much existing policy discussion on social housing assumes a continuation of its current, 
circumscribed role as primarily a response to significant, complex need. An infrastructure 
perspective, however, offers a starting point for the social housing system to take on a broader 
role, one of relevance to housing market dysfunction more generally. Although there is need to 
be nuanced in the application of infrastructure policy settings to social housing, to preserve its 
core values and purposes, using an infrastructure conceptualisation makes explicit the potential 
of social housing investment to be a legitimate, powerful strategic intervention. 
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2.4 Implications for policy 
Recognising social housing more explicitly in policy as a form of essential social infrastructure 
provides a basis on which investment can be better calibrated to need. However, it may also 
lead to social housing being considered primarily or exclusively through an ‘asset lens’, with a 
corresponding interpretation of the ‘outcomes’ these assets should be enabling. It narrows the 
purpose of social housing to one facilitating particular kinds of economic performance and 
constructs tenants as objects of intervention designed to promote ‘outcomes’ like social and 
economic participation. This presents risks for applicants or tenants who are deemed to lack 
capacity for enhanced productivity or economic participation, and devalues tenants’ own 
aspirations and preferences.  
Historically, social housing in Australia fulfilled a broader role: it addressed a range of social and 
economic needs, and enabled the achievement of a range of social and economic aspirations 
by promoting decent living conditions for all Australians. Conceptualised in this way, future 
investment in social housing could alleviate a much wider set of problems in the private housing 
market than is currently possible under the existing ‘safety net’ model of provision, and allow the 
system to once again contribute on multiple levels to a broader agenda of social and economic 
inclusion and development. 
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3 Taking the right pathway of financing and funding 
Ensuring necessary and appropriate levels of social housing investment begins with 
a well-evidenced understanding of the scale, type and location of need; and 
secondly, an accurate understanding of the cost of procuring appropriate dwellings 
in the right locations. The design of an investment pathway, and the use of public or 
private equity and debt, also significantly influences the cost to government and the 
wider community.  
x Our research builds a customised method for establishing both current unmet 
need (the backlog) for social housing, and future projected need based on a 
proportionate share of expected household growth. It also provides evidence for 
the great diversity of land procurement and construction costs, depending on 
geographic location  
x Five alternative social housing pathways have been modelled, involving a range 
of debt, efficient financing and capital grant strategies, to assess their relative 
costs to government. The research identifies the ‘capital grant’ model, 
supplemented by efficient financing, as providing the most cost-effective 
pathway for Australia—in preference to the ‘no capital grant, commercially 
financed, operating subsidy-funded’ model. 
x Over the next 20 years, we estimate that 727,300 additional social housing 
dwellings will be required, with current-price procurement costs varying from 
$146,000 to $614,000 per dwelling, depending on local land values, building 
types and construction costs in different regions. This report provides extensive 
data on needs and costs for 88 statistical areas (SA4 level). 
x Where public housing rents are set at levels affordable to low-income 
households, revenues can only support modest levels of government debt 
financing, and thus private co-investment is required.  
x International experience on infrastructure investment pathways demonstrates 
the suite of land, funding and financing instruments required, alongside political 
support, to increase social housing production. It also cautions that, while off-
balance-sheet public–private partnerships (PPPs) and PFI approaches have been 
widely utilised in comparator countries (as well as in Australia), these have often 
proven sub-optimal in terms of cost efficiency and effectiveness (NAO 2015; 
2018b).  
x This chapter provides inspiration from the productive, supply-orientated social 
housing systems that flourish in countries such as Scotland, Finland, France and 
Austria, and most prominently amongst our Asian neighbours, China, Korea and 
Singapore. 
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3.1 The concept of an infrastructure investment pathway 
An ‘infrastructure investment pathway’ is the route capital takes to construct and operate assets 
and services that deliver social and economic benefits to society. Both funding and financing 
play an integral role in this pathway. ‘Funding’ describes the resources allocated by 
governments and the community to cover capital investment and operating costs. ’Financing’ 
describes the instruments or arrangements through which these costs, especially high upfront 
capital costs, are spread over time as government surpluses and service charge revenues 
allow. Seen in this light, financing ultimately requires funding and is not a replacement for it 
(Lawson, Pawson et al. 2018). 
Social housing shares similarities with many other forms of social infrastructure serving societal 
(as well as economic) needs (Chan, Forwood et al. 2009: 3). Schools, courts, prisons and 
hospitals are also long-term asset-based services that enhance social and economic wellbeing, 
and which are allocated on a ‘needs’ rather than ‘capacity to pay’ basis. Investment in social 
infrastructure enables essential services to be delivered more equitably and effectively: schools 
enable education, hospitals enable health care, and social housing enables households, whose 
accommodation needs cannot be met by the operation of market forces, to establish and secure 
a home (Lawson, Pawson et al. 2018). 
While some forms of infrastructure apply ‘user pays’ charges, an expectation that cost of 
provision can be fully recovered in this way may be incompatible with the social and economic 
benefits the service is intended to deliver. Thus, services such as health and education are 
neither delivered on a full-fee paying basis nor operated to extract surpluses or even be cost-
recovering. The use of subsidies is integral to all needs-based services, and their operation and 
design must also be equitable, efficient and effective (Lawson, Pawson et al. 2018). 
Social housing aims to provide affordable accommodation to eligible low-income households, 
who pay some form of submarket rent, cost rent or rent geared to income. This typically involves 
the use of subsidies, affecting the costs of supply and the revenue from demand. The aim of 
this research is to strengthen Australia’s social housing investment pathway by building capacity 
in our understanding of the role of investment, needs assessment and financing alternatives.  
3.2 Social housing costs, revenues and the funding gap 
Social housing, with its eligibility criteria, allocations and rent policy, distributes housing 
opportunities in a fundamentally different way to the private rental market. Social housing is 
provided by public state housing authorities and increasingly regulated not for profit landlords, 
who have a mission to deliver specific community service obligations including: 
x allocation of housing according to need, especially that not met by market 
x rent setting, to maximise social return not commercial return 
x management of waiting lists, to ensure fair access is given to eligible households 
x maximising social outcomes through good tenant management and neighbour relations 
x negotiating arrears problems and seeking alternatives to eviction 
x conducting client surveys to improve tenant services 
x providing data for budgeting, strategic planning and policy development 
x implementing tenant participation and support programs 
x liaising with external services—education, employment, health and justice—to support 
tenants and improve estates 
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x overseeing construction of new dwellings (Lawson 2017).  
A generalised model of social housing costs and revenues, shown in Figure 4, highlights the 
role that various policies and market conditions play in provision. Importantly, these instruments 
and conditions also influence the magnitude of the funding gap, being the difference between 
the cost of procurement and the revenues received to cover these costs.  
Indeed, a range of government policies and instruments used in social housing systems affect 
both the upfront cost of provision as well as the rent revenue received. Rents may be based on 
market levels, the historic cost of production or financing costs, or geared to household 
incomes. These scenarios are depicted as 1, 2 and 3 in Figure 4.  
Subsidies directed towards individual tenants are often described as ‘individual demand-side 
consumer subsidies’. If they are directed towards landlords, they are considered to be 
‘operating subsidies’. Subsidies directed towards the construction of housing are often 
described as ‘production’ or ‘supply-side subsidies’, as represented in Figure 4. Ideally, 
government commitment to subsidy settings is stable and long term, to foster innovation and 
investment.  
To ensure that subsidies are used for their intended purpose, providers are typically well-
regulated not for profit housing providers with a public purpose. They may receive tax 
exemptions, grants or access to low-cost financing in recognition of their social task and not for 
profit business operation.  
Increasingly, however, for-profit providers advocate for a greater role in affordable housing 
provision, seeking to take advantage of accumulated public equity, low-cost financing, and 
potential access to long-term concession payments. In Australia the social housing system is 
broadening to include a role for Real Estate Investment Trusts (REIT) in acquisition, leaseback 
arrangements and concession payment arrangements, also in the field of disability housing 
field. This introduces a very different policy and subsidy dynamic which, although attractive in 
the short term, PFI and REITs can prove very costly for governments and service users in the 
medium to long run. Serious problems have arisen with inflexible PFI schemes (NAO, 2018b), 
reliance on global providers (NAO, 2018a) and REITs extracting fees from housing providers 
reliant on government concession payments (Barratt, 2019).  
These recent Australian developments reflect tends in the privatisation and financialisation of 
social housing in parts of Europe. For example, following abolition of NFP housing laws in 
Germany, and later through sales of municipal housing assets, property investment hedge fund 
Vonovia quickly became the largest owner of social housing in Germany, with 370,000 units 
(Wijberg and Aalbers 2017). The company is now making inroads into social housing systems in 
other European countries, such as the Netherlands (Aalbers, Van Loon et al. 2017) and more 
recently France (Saunderson 2018) and the UK. These developments will have profound 
implications for the purpose of social housing (commercialisation) and growth of this segment of 
the housing market (reduced) in the years ahead.  
Housing assistance can be provided by governments indirectly through the tax system, offering 
exemptions for NFP organisations or tax credits for investors in affordable housing, or more 
directly through upfront grants or ongoing recurrent subsidies to individual households or 
housing providers.  
Direct capital investment can be in the form of long-term equity held in social housing land or 
accommodation assets that can be released or revolved over time. Governments try to ensure 
that this equity remains in use for its intended purpose over the long term—often over 
generations. In the UK, regulations governing equity have recently loosened, heralding a new 
era of for-profit social housing investment: out bidding not for profits for land and housing and 
REITs extracting concession payments from supported accommodation providers (Williams 
2018, Barratt, 2019). 
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Figure 4: Generalised social housing costs, revenues and subsidy instruments 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: Adapted from Lawson, Pawson et al. 2018. 
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France, Sweden and the Netherlands—and in the Australian Capital Territory (ACT). 
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Governments use land leases as a means to more closely manage the use of land. Where 
secure long-term leasehold is the norm, it becomes acceptable to financial institutions from 
which credit is obtained.  
The second set of instruments concerns direct capital investment from a variety of sources: 
governments, landlords and tenants. Capital investment programs are used by governments to 
ensure satisfactory scale, location and quality of provision via conditional grants or ‘silent equity’ 
(as in the UK), which acts as a hedge against inflating land and housing costs and may be 
retained and revolved over time to ensure responsiveness to need.  
Direct public investment remains the most influential mechanism to increase social housing 
supply levels in most countries—for example, public housing programs in the US, Austria’s 
broadly accessible regional housing programs, and the UK’s housing assistance grants. Some 
countries, such as Switzerland and Austria, additionally rely on tenants to contribute equity for 
new projects. In many countries, grants are linked to the cost of provision in local areas and the 
complexity or depth of needs being addressed, as in Finland.  
The third set of instruments aims to improve access to, and reduce the cost of, financing social 
housing (as distinct from funding it). In Europe and globally, national and multilateral 
development banks drive investment in social housing to promote social inclusion, economic 
resilience and sustainable development. They provide mission-focussed loans, often with grants 
for (green) social housing, to work towards these goals. In Europe, their role has increased 
since the GFC, due to the associated lack of long-term private investment and inequality of 
housing access, and the threat that social exclusion poses to overall social harmony and 
political stability.  
AHURI has led international research on intermediaries and guarantees to improve borrowing 
conditions for CHOs, which contributed to the establishment of the National Housing Finance 
and Investment Corporation (NHFIC) in 2018. A guarantee on housing bonds (Lawson, Berry et 
al. 2014; Lawson 2013) was also promised by the government (Sukkar 2017). 
The fourth set of instruments concerns the implicit but nevertheless influential measures that 
can be used through the tax system. Well-designed incentives steer investment towards desired 
housing providers and tenant outcomes. Most NFP housing associations are mission-focussed 
organisations that are tax exempt and must reinvest surpluses in providing more affordable 
housing. Yet, inappropriate tax incentives can fuel speculation and overinvestment in the 
housing market, worsening affordability and supply outcomes.  
Fifthly, revenue can be used to support investment as well as influence rent policies (cost rent, 
market rent, etc.). Revenue can also be used to influence the design of rent allowance systems 
to tenants, plus provide guarantees on rent payments by government and operating subsidies to 
landlords.  
In Australia, as elsewhere, there has been a shift from supply- to demand-side subsidies, which 
has led to a decline in housing supply outcomes. Across the EU, the proportion of housing 
assistance spent on housing allowances between 2009 and 2015 rose from 54 per cent to 
75 per cent, with the highest share (85%) in the UK (Eurostat 2009- 2015 in NHF 2017). In 
contrast, total expenditure on housing development in the EU has declined by 44 per cent, from 
€48.2 billion in 2009 to €27.5 billion in 2015. Many social housing systems, most notably in the 
UK, have relied on private investment, bolstered by rising rents and deep housing allowances, 
to address declining upfront public capital investment in social housing (Williams and Whitehead 
2015). 
Finally, as a consequence of declining equity investment in social housing and value-extractive 
policies, there has been greater emphasis on asset ‘recycling’ and mixed public–private 
redevelopment, as we’ve seen in Australia. Ring-fenced asset management strategies (Robin 
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Hood strategies) may also be used to provide surpluses and transparently cross-subsidise 
social housing. 
Figure 5: Policies and market conditions influencing the funding gap 
 
Source: Adapted from Lawson, Pawson et al. (2018). 
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guiding responsible actors to perform their different roles well. Canada’s 10-year National 
Housing Strategy attempts to transform federal–state relations by providing clear upfront 
principles, focusing on vulnerable households, using the fiscal strength of the national 
government, and delivering negotiated agreements with provinces and territories. In other 
federal states, such as Austria, national governments provide an overarching legislative 
framework for the use of subsidies for housing and ensure tax settings and funds are available, 
and regulate providers using those instruments. Under this legislated framework, regional 
governments design housing programs responding to local needs and priorities.6 Other national 
strategies promote accessible housing for all, as in France and Finland, where the right to 
housing is enshrined, respectively, in legislation and the Constitution. 
To inform housing programs, information based on housing needs is vital. Valid national and 
local data on the nature of housing need and market conditions—and indicators on affordability, 
adequacy and availability of housing for different households—should be agreed, collected, 
analysed and regularly reported. Canada has long-established norms around the notion of Core 
Housing Need, which prioritises efforts to assist low-income households paying more than 
30 per cent of their income in housing costs. Further, it should be possible to disaggregate 
these indicators to regional and local sub-geographical area, offering more meaningful 
representation of ‘need’ to inform local decision makers. In the US, evidence of critical housing 
problems facing low-income Americans is provided annually to Congress, and is regularly 
updated by the American Housing Survey (US Census Bureau, 2018), funded by the 
Department of Housing and Urban Development (HUD) and the Census Bureau. The report 
provides evidence on the affordability, availability and adequacy of housing (HUD 2017) and 
defines worst-case housing needs confronted by renters with very low incomes—defined as 
being below 50 per cent of the Area Median Income (AMI).  
Such information, indicators and their reporting requirements can inform localised targets for a 
strategy and underpin well-defined and disaggregated milestones. British Columbia’s Housing 
Matters BC strategy ‘report card’ for 2006–12 (2012) assessed performance against six 
strategic objectives, using measurable performance outcomes. Results were presented both 
aggregated and disaggregated, and supply targets were clearly articulated (see Lawson in SGS 
2016). Performance is closely linked to budgetary reporting under the Budget Transparency and 
Accountability Act and the BC Reporting Principles (BC Housing, 2015) 
The Scottish Government provides Housing Need Demand Assessments (HNDAs) to local and 
regional housing and planning departments to help them formulate joint housing strategies, with 
realistic performance indicators and clear targets that can be periodically assessed and 
adapted. The government provides technical assistance is to aid program design, as well as 
funding, training and access to financing instruments. Local procurement processes, land 
banking, land-use zoning and planning permission processes are also implemented, alongside 
the use of strategic development funds.  
Some strategies govern procurement systems across public and private social housing 
providers. In England, smaller registered social housing landlords are encouraged to pool their 
purchasing efforts to achieve economies of scale and reduce construction and financing costs. 
In British Columbia, government provides procurement guidance to all NFP providers, to ensure 
                                               
 
6 For example, the city state of Vienna employs a well-established mechanism for commissioning developments 
on its land corporation sites, applying ‘four pillar’ principles for development competitions: architectural quality, 
value for money, ecological quality and social sustainability. Social sustainability refers to the development’s role 
in building positive, inclusive communities, as well as promoting greater diversity and participation in subsidised 
housing development. 
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that goods and services commissioned are subject to a transparent, competitive and purposeful 
tendering processes. 
Evaluation is likewise vital to the ongoing effectiveness of a national procurement strategy. In 
Austria, all providers in receipt of housing supply subsidies must be accountable for their use, 
and not only undergo three months of monitoring and auditing each year but also report to 
subsidy bodies, as required in national housing subsidy legislation (see Deutsch and Lawson 
2013). In contrast, in the US, NFP landlords are only lightly regulated, while public housing 
authorities are subject to adequate but not onerous compliance processes and good regulation 
rather than deregulation.  
To ensure adequate resourcing, some national strategies require regular reports on 
performance, linking the level of resources allocated in their government’s housing budget to 
key objectives and reforms. British Columbia’s long-term housing strategy is regularly updated 
and there is evidence from 2012 and, particularly, 2015 that strategic performance strongly 
influences outcomes reporting (BC Housing, 2015). A similar reporting ethic can be found with 
Scottish Parliament’s budgetary reporting on housing targets.  
In federal systems, complexity of governance and the necessity for resource sharing, 
negotiation and partnership, provide both barriers and opportunities for comprehensive 
standards, the design of responsive programs and good housing outcomes. A fuller discussion 
of this topic can be found in Lawson, Legacy et al. (2016), which contrasted four federal states 
and their role in housing policies and programs.  
3.3.1 Insights from key stakeholders  
Through industry workshops, the Inquiry’s research recorded the perspectives of stakeholders 
at the forefront of efforts to grow social housing in Australia. The sessions involved chief 
financial officers and investment appraisers from New South Wales CHOs and the Clean 
Energy Finance Corporation (CEFC)7, who had detailed knowledge of both finance and 
development issues. Their discussions generated valuable insights, presented in detail in 
Lawson, Pawson et al. (2018). Stakeholder recommendations for policy development are 
summarised as follows. 
Box 1: Stakeholder recommendations for policy development 
x Fund an adequate affordable and green housing program, as exists in similarly 
developed countries, with balanced supply- and demand-side subsidies to ensure 
effective supply outcomes.  
x Reallocate government revenues, such as stamp duty and capital gains, arising from 
housing price gains to ensure adequate lower-income rental housing opportunities.  
x Ensure savings from any housing-related tax reforms are used to fund new capital 
investment programs for new (and green) social housing. 
x Develop a clear conception of housing need, addressing the backlog of need; and plan 
for the replacement of run-down social housing assets currently in service.  
                                               
 
7 The CEFC has established an investment strategy to promote green social housing. According to the CEFC, 
‘New-build community housing should be designed to ambitious energy efficiency standards and the existing 
stock should be refurbished to improve energy efficiency … Long-term debt finance from the Clean Energy 
Finance Corporation can help community housing organisations develop and renew community housing 
dwellings and ensure those properties are built to high standards of energy efficiency.’ (2016a: 3). 
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x Quantify the benefits of decent secure and affordable housing—and the avoided costs of 
insecure, unaffordable and poorly located housing (borne by the homeless and those in 
housing stress, as well as governments) in related health, justice and support costs. 
x Do not rely on internal cross-subsidisation between current portfolios to grow social 
housing through redevelopment of existing assets, as this is limited, unsustainable and 
risky. 
x Establish robust agreements on the definition of positive impact measures to drive good 
performance.  
x Reform land valuation policies and practice to acknowledge the residual value of social 
housing provision. 
x Capitalise on closely related investment strategies such as the Specialist Disability 
Accommodation (SDA) payment scheme8 and CEFC’s financing of energy-efficient 
community housing.9 
Source: Industry consultation in Lawson, Pawson et al. (2018). 
3.4 More productive approaches 
Australian governments once supported a much larger social housing construction program, 
producing between 8,000 and 14,000 units per year from the 1950s to the 1990s (Troy 2012)—
this has declined to fewer than 3,000 units today (Flanagan, Martin et al, 2019). We now rely on 
the private rental sector, via CRA, to house the poorest households, but this has proven 
increasingly ineffective in reducing housing stress, especially amongst young people, singles 
and older single women, reliant on Commonwealth pensions. Evidence for 2017–18 found that 
40.4 per cent of all households receiving CRA remain in housing stress after receiving CRA 
(Productivity Commission 2019). Australia’s demand-assisted ‘solution’ is made less effective by 
the weak rent and tenancy protection afforded by the private rental market (Martin, Hulse et al. 
2018; Ey 2016).  
This Inquiry necessarily examined alternative best practice in Europe, Asia and the Americas, 
and found that Singapore, France, Austria and Finland have more effective instruments for 
steering investment towards desired housing outcomes than currently exist in Australia. These 
strategies are underpinned by national legislation, with funding programs offering conditional 
grants alongside mission-focussed long-term financing. The schemes are supported by effective 
regulation, and guided by regional urban policy and local land policies which are ‘pro-social’. In 
contrast with modest social housing supply outcomes in Australia, these governments are 
making significant headway, as summarised below. 
Box 2: International approaches to social housing supply 
x UK local authorities and NFP housing associations completed more than 35,000 homes 
in 2017 (19% of total national housing completions), utilising planning contributions, 
grants, deep demand subsidies and efficient private financing (including guarantees on 
loans financed by the European Investment Bank) (MHLGC, 2018).10 Social housing 
                                               
 
8 See operational guidelines of the National Disability Insurance Scheme’s SDA: 
https://www.ndis.gov.au/Operational-Guideline/SDA 
9 See CEFC Community Housing Program: https://www.cefc.com.au/where-we-invest/community-housing/ 
10 Note that the Ministry of Housing, Communities and Local Government (MHCLG) statistics understate the 
contribution of housing authorities—possibly because of the ambiguity around new builds that are not social 
housing. For England-specific statistics regarding housing association builds, see NHF (2018). 
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landlords and municipalities are being called upon to increase production dramatically in 
2018, through partnerships and increased municipal borrowing.  
x The Austrian limited-profit housing sector continues to supply a steady 14,000 to 16,000 
dwellings per year—which is around 30 per cent of all new housing built across the 
country—and acts as a shock absorber and stabiliser amidst changing private and 
commercial housing construction (IIBW 2016). Again, facilitative local planning, including 
land banking, the provision of grants and favourable loans, are used extensively—also to 
improve energy efficiency and social inclusion.  
x In Finland, the production of subsidised dwellings has increased to almost 8,000 per 
year, providing 22 per cent of all new dwellings. This growth was ensured via conditional 
provision grants, interest rate subsidies, loan guarantees, and efficient financing provided 
via a central agency and municipal infrastructure bank (The Housing Finance and 
Development Centre of Finland—ARA). Finland is arguably the most effective country in 
Europe in addressing homelessness, with a continuous 30 decline in those surveyed as 
being homeless (Linden, 2017). 
x There has been sustained effort in social housing production across France since the 
1990s (Schaeffer 2017), increasing immediately after the GFC to ensure greater 
economic stability and social harmony with investment in 100,000 social units produced 
per year. This housing has been assisted via long term mission focussed investment 
channelled via France’s specialist intermediary the CDC. Also notable is the national law 
on urban planning requiring social housing to account for 25 per cent of all housing in 
local areas by 2025, with Paris aiming for even higher: 30 per cent by 2030 (Alcade 
2018).  
What makes these international social housing investment pathways more productive is their 
combination of policy strategies which shape the supply and allocation of affordable housing 
and not just the demand for it. They use instruments that ensure access to suitable land, invest 
public equity strategically, ensuring financing is efficient and mission-driven and regulate 
subsidies effectively.  
As shown in the examples above, more productive social housing systems do not rely on 
demand-side assistance alone—as we see in Finland, with sliding grants, mission-focussed 
financing and NFP regulation. Very productive systems have been achieved in France via pro-
social circuits of savings and finance, tax instruments and inclusionary zoning, and in the UK 
involving conditional grants, development contributions from planning agreements and deep 
housing benefits for low income tenants. Excessive reliance-demand side assistance has been 
resisted in Austria, where the government’s aim is to ensure construction levels meet both the 
need for housing, energy efficient standards and provide for greater economic stability. 
Strategic use of direct investment aims to catalyse economic activity, spark innovation and 
solve public problems, thereby laying the foundations for more inclusive economic growth and 
societal wellbeing.  
As we demonstrate later in this chapter, strategic direct investment can also reduce the long-
term costs to government, by reducing pressure on service charges and related assistance in 
other policy areas.  
Comparing the costs and benefits of private finance (such as the UK’s PFI) with direct public 
investment, has been a focus of numerous evaluations (NAO 2015, 2018; Hodges and Grubnic 
2005; Edwards, Shaoul et al. 2004; Blanc-Brude, Goldsmith et al. 2006; Pollock, Price et al. 
2007). These have found the UK’s PFI to be particularly costly and complex. Reliance on 
private financing and providers carries substantial risks for governments who remain 
responsible for service levels and quality of provision. Large-scale collapses of global service 
providers, such as construction giant Carillion (NAO 2018a), cost overruns (NAO 2015) and the 
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tragedy of the Grenfell Tower11 fire have all led to more critical reflection on PFI approaches, 
and the scheme was abolished in November 2018. In the main, direct public investment is 
increasingly considered to be more straightforward and less expensive for governments at a 
time of low public borrowing costs (NAO 2018; Lawson, Pawson et al. 2018).  
Much greater transparency in comparing the cost of capital is necessary in order for policy-
makers and program designers to responsibly determine the ideal mix of funding and financing 
that should be used to address Australia’s social housing deficit. This Inquiry aims to inform 
further deliberations towards a national housing investment strategy. 
3.5 Investment required to address needs 
To strengthen Australia’s capacity in needs-based planning of social housing investment, and in 
securing and allocating appropriate levels of public funding, the research team set out to 
measure national housing requirements and associated procurement costs.  
To calculate the government capital investment required, it is necessary to estimate:  
1 the scale of unmet need  
2 the total cost of providing the homes required to meet that need (bearing in mind its spatial 
distribution)  
3 the part of that cost in excess of what housing providers should be able to finance through 
debt.  
In addressing point 1, above, we build on previously published methodologies to estimate the 
need for social housing over the next 20 years, to accommodate both current unmet need (the 
backlog) and future projected need, based on a proportionate share of expected future 
household growth. Three component groups are considered:  
x existing social housing renters 
x those constituting ‘manifest (additional) need’ (i.e. homeless populations)  
x those constituting ‘evident (additional) need’ (i.e. those with housing needs unmet by the 
market, but outside the above groups)—both current and projected.  
The third group is operationalised as households on a low income (i.e. in the bottom quintile for 
the relevant household type) and in rental stress (i.e. in private rental and paying more than 30 
per cent of income on rent). 
As summarised in Table 4, addressing the deficit and future need will call for the construction of 
some 730,000 new social housing dwellings over the next 20 years. This equates to an annual 
average growth of 5.5 per cent over the existing stock.  
  
                                               
 
11 The fire engulfed a high rise tower of social housing apartments which were cladded in a flammable material, 
causing the death of 72 people. 
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Table 4: Summary of current and projected housing need estimates, by need source 
Area of 
Australia 
Social housing share Manifest need Evident need Total 
need 
2016–36 
Current 
(met) 
Projected 
to 2036 
Current Projected 
to 2036 
Current Projected 
to 2036 
 
Column a Column b Column c Column d Column e Column f Sum of 
col’s b–f 
Greater 
Sydney 
85.4 31.6 11.6 4.3 67.9 25.2 140.6 
Rest of NSW 48.3 7.3 3.5 0.5 52.8 8.0 72.1 
Greater 
Melbourne 
46.5 20.6 8.2 3.6 65.9 29.2 127.5 
Rest of Vic. 21.1 4.1 1.7 0.3 27.0 5.3 38.5 
Greater 
Brisbane 
32.3 15.4 3.7 1.8 39.4 18.8 79.2 
Rest of Qld 35.3 14.1 5.0 2.0 53.4 21.3 95.7 
Greater 
Perth 
24.5 17.0 2.1 1.5 28.2 19.6 68.3 
Rest of WA 14.9 6.2 1.5 0.6 7.0 2.9 18.2 
Greater 
Adelaide 
33.8 8.5 1.9 0.5 23.7 5.9 40.4 
Rest of SA 9.7 0.9 0.6 0.1 7.2 0.7 9.5 
Greater 
Hobart 
5.7 1.0 0.3 0.1 4.4 0.8 6.6 
Rest of Tas. 6.4 0.6 0.3 0.0 6.1 0.6 7.6 
ACT 9.9 4.1 0.6 0.3 2.5 1.0 8.5 
Greater 
Darwin 
3.1 1.0 0.7 0.2 0.9 0.3 3.2 
Rest of NT 7.7 3.7 4.8 2.3 0.3 0.2 11.3 
Australia 384.6 136.2 46.6 18.1 386.8 139.7 727.3 
Note: All figures are in ‘000s. 
Source: Lawson, Pawson et al. (2018). 
Figure 6 shows how this additional growth accounts for both current unmet need (the backlog) 
and future projected need, based on a proportionate share of future household growth. 
AHURI Final Report No. 315 37 
Figure 6: Social housing need being met by 2036 (left) and as a proportion of all 
households (right)  
Source: Lawson, Pawson et al. (2018). 
Table 5, below, shows the range of total procurement costs for the regions within each of the 
states and territories—this includes the estimated land and construction costs, estimated 
professional fees (legal and design services), and local-impact fees/infrastructure contributions. 
Table 5: Estimated construction costs and dwelling type distribution 
Section of 
Australia 
Share of 
needed 
growth 
(%) 
Range of 
estimated 
cost/unit 
($000s) 
Distribution of unit type 
Detached 
(%) 
Attached 
(%) 
Low-rise 
(%) 
High-rise 
(%) 
Greater Sydney 19.3 210–614 0 21 60 19 
Rest of NSW 9.9 173–393 79 21 0 0 
Greater 
Melbourne 
17.5 220–442 0 70 13 17 
Rest of Vic. 5.3 170–203 100 0 0 0 
Greater Brisbane 10.9 208–357 15 61 23 0 
Rest of Qld 13.2 179–285 72 28 0 0 
Greater Perth 9.4 184–316 0 92 8 0 
Rest of WA 2.5 162–265 100 0 0 0 
Greater Adelaide 5.6 184–261 0 83 17 0 
Rest of SA 1.3 146–157 100 0 0 0 
Greater Hobart 0.9 271 100 0 0 0 
Rest of Tas. 1.0 172–189 100 0 0 0 
ACT 1.2 418 0 100 0 0 
Greater Darwin 0.4 256 0 100 0 0 
Rest of NT 1.5 186 100 0 0 0 
Overall 100.0 146–614 32 44 18 7 
Note: 2017 prices used.  
Source: Lawson, Pawson et al. (2018). 
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3.6 Funding the gap 
Affordable rents for low-income households can only cover part of the costs of procuring, 
managing and maintaining this body of housing (AHWG 2017), and this varies geographically 
(as shown in Figure 7). This suggests that a one-size-fits-all approach to capital investment 
must be avoided at all costs. Rather, a more nuanced and strategic effort must be incorporated 
in allocating processes in order to avoid wasteful misuse of subsidies and the concentration of 
disadvantage. 
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Figure 7: Funding gap per dwelling by region 
Note: The maps use Statistical Area 4 (SA$) ABS boundaries. 
Source: Lawson, Pawson et al, 2018 
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3.6.1 Cost to government-influenced funding and financing strategy 
Following from Figures 5 and 6, it is crucial to note that the overall size of the funding gap, and 
consequently the cost to government, varies to significant degrees as a result of different 
funding and financing strategies. To date, modelling the costs of social and affordable housing 
delivery and the likely ‘funding gap’ that exists between revenues and costs has largely 
occurred without reference to need, cost, revenues or geographical context (e.g. AHWG 2017). 
Our research unpacks this carefully, using evidence and modelling to show how these factors 
affect project feasibility and the funding gap of affordable housing developments across 
Australia (Randolph, Troy et al. 2018). 
The housing need analysis to 2036 (Lawson, Pawson et al. 2018) established both a quantum 
of housing required and a tenant income profile by geography, generating a more 
geographically nuanced assessment of costs and potential rental revenues (summarised in 
Tables 4 and 5, above). This defined housing need was then input into a reconfigured version of 
the Affordable Housing Assessment Tool (AHAT) developed as part of previous research (see 
Randolph, Troy et al. 2018), based on project-level costings of CHO-led developments from 
across Australia.  
The AHAT model assumes a NFP housing developer, so does not include any profit margin 
within the feasibility assessment. This represents the lowest-cost option, as a for-profit 
development model would include a profit margin as part of the cost structure. The construction 
cost component has been based on industry standard costs, so does not make any 
assumptions about real or perceived differences in costs where building work is undertaken by 
the private or public sector. However, one of the modelled impacts is the cost of taxation 
concessions given to the NFP community housing sector, which are not accessible by for-profit 
developers—again, this would introduce an added cost layer if for-profit models were assumed 
desirable. 
In Australia’s multi-provider affordable housing system, social housing is largely provided by the 
public sector and the community housing sector. There are two critical differences in 
development feasibility between a public sector NFP developer and a community housing 
sector NFP. The first is the access to tax concessions (GST, land tax and stamp duties), which, 
cumulatively, have a substantial impact on the overall costs of development. The second is 
access to CRA payments, with the current public housing model precluding state housing 
tenants from receiving CRA payments and in effect limiting the total rent that state agencies can 
charge.  
The reconfigured AHAT model applied the spatially differentiated estimate of need, land and 
construction costs, based on assessment of local need profiles at the subregional level (using 
ABS ‘SA4’ geography) developed in this research. It also detailed operating cost assumptions, 
such as NFP provision and relevant tax settings. Each investment pathway aims to be cost 
neutral after 20 years. Five pathways have been modelled to enable a comparison of their costs 
to government, as outlined in Table 6. 
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Table 6: Investment scenarios for comparison 
Scenario Definition 
1 Operating subsidy  Base case. Funding gap is supported by an annual 
operational subsidy payment that supports paying 
for finance (where all the required debt is taken out 
by the provider in the expectation of future subsidy 
support). 
2 Operating subsidy + NHFIC bond 
aggregator 
Builds on scenario 1, but applies an interest rate 
deduction on private finance at a rate of 1.5%, 
which is consistent with estimates of the efficiency 
gain a bond aggregator on the cost of private 
finance (Lawson, Berry et al, 2014, EY, 2017, 
NHFIC, 2019). 
3 Upfront capital grant  As an alternative to private debt, a capital fund 
invests in developments, which reduces the level of 
required subsidy because it eliminates financing 
costs. 
4 Upfront capital grant + NHFIC 
bond aggregator 
Introduces an interest rate deduction on the capital 
grant model, similar to that of scenario 2. This 
reduces the interest rate of finance from an 
assumed market rate of 5% p.a. to 3.5% p.a. 
5 Upfront capital grant + NHFIC 
bond aggregator, excluding CRA 
CRA as a housing support payment is appropriately 
conceptualised as an operating subsidy. This 
scenario models the impact of excluding CRA 
payments from a capital grant model, which 
increases the capital grant requirement. 
Source: Lawson, Pawson et al. (2018). 
Figure 8 illustrates the comparison of commercially financed operating subsidy models with 
upfront capital grant and more efficient NHFIC financing, demonstrating that the costs to 
governments are substantially reduced when public equity in the form of a capital grant is 
included in the investment mix and debt is raised in the most efficient manner (via NHFIC). 
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As summarised in Table 7, below, debt-financed models significantly increase the necessity for 
housing provider to drawn on an operating subsidy and/or maximise CRA payment. These costs 
to governments are substantially reduced when public equity, in the form of a capital grant, is 
included in the investment mix and debt is raised in the most efficient manner.  
Furthermore, where the level of capital grant is increased, rents can be kept at affordable levels 
without tenants (or CHOs) having to rely on CRA.12 
Table 7: Comparison of five investment pathways 
Program 
Summary 
(Lifetime 
cost of Year 
1 of 
program) 
Scenario 1: 
Private 
financing 
with 
operating 
subsidy  
Scenario 2: 
NHFIC 
financing 
with 
operating 
subsidy 
Scenario 3: 
Upfront 
capital 
grant 
Scenario 4: 
Upfront 
capital 
grant + 
NHFIC 
financing 
Scenario 5: 
Larger 
capital 
grant + 
NHFIC, 
excluding 
cost of CRA 
Total 
development 
costs (excl. 
GST and 
taxes) 
 $7.0B  $6.4B $5.8B  $5.7B $5.4B 
Total 
operating 
costs 
 $2.8B  $2.8B $2.8B $2.8B $2.8B 
Rental 
income 
 $3.2B  $3.2B $3.2B $3.2B $3.2B 
Operating/ 
capital grant 
 $5.4B  $4.8B $4.2B $4.1B $5.0B  
CRA 
payments 
 $1.2B  $1.2B $1.2B  $1.2B   
Government 
subsidy 
 $6.6B  $6.0B  $5.4B  $5.3B $5.0B 
Savings on 
Scenario 1 
- 9% 18% 20% 24% 
Note: Scenario 1 = operating subsidy. Scenario 2 = operating subsidy + NHFIC bond aggregator. Scenario 3 = 
upfront capital grant. Scenario 4 = Upfront capital grant + NHFIC bond aggregator. Scenario 5 = Upfront capital 
grant + NHFIC bond aggregator, excluding CRA. 
Source: Lawson, Pawson et al. (2018). 
Overall, our modelling reveals that a needs-based capital investment (NBC) strategy is 
substantially more cost-effective in the short and long term than a commercially financed model 
that is reliant on an operating subsidy to ensure affordable social tenancies. Indeed, privately 
                                               
 
12 It should be noted that CHOs are able to adjust rent levels to maximise the CRA payments to tenants and are 
also permitted to claim the entire CRA entitlement. Current CHO rent setting strategies are variably focused on 
maximising access to CRA payments. Some CHOs are required under agreement to ensure rents do not exceed 
25–30 per cent of incomes (as in public housing), income is taken to mean pre-CRA amounts, which is 
equivalent to a tenant living in public housing who is not entitled to CRA. 
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financed and subsidised strategies are 24 per cent more expensive in the first year alone and 
these costs accumulate with each new tranche of privately financed dwellings.  
Under privately financed models, recurrent expenses continue for a considerably longer 
duration, to fulfil long-term financing obligations. This places a heavy burden on public finances 
and can limit new or alternative infrastructure investments. This finding mirrors that of the UK 
National Audit Office (NAO) on the abolished PFI initiative (NAO 2015; 2018b). As shown in 
Figure 9, below, a significant disadvantage of the operating subsidy model comes at the end of 
Year 20, when operating subsidies would still be required to be paid out on dwellings built in the 
later part of the program, unlike a capital grant model. 
Figure 9: Annual expenditure under capital grant vs. operating subsidy programs 
Note: All values are represented as net present value (NPV) and do not include any costs associated with CRA 
payments. 
Source: Lawson, Pawson et al. (2018). 
It should be noted that an operating subsidy is a recurrent expense to government—it is not an 
investment in the public estate, building a portfolio of permanent social housing assets. Unlike 
recurrent operating subsidies, capital investment in the form of conditional grants or retained 
equity contributes to the public estate and provides a useful hedge against inflation. This value 
can later be used to reinvest in renovation or replacement of stock over time.  
Upfront capital investment can be even more strategic and purposeful. A nuanced capital 
investment strategy can address spatially differentiated needs and, importantly, efficiencies in 
procurement costs (especially land costs). It can also drive innovation in construction and 
respond to changing market conditions to deliver a range of policy goals, from skilled 
employment to transport mobility and energy-efficient design. 
3.7 The most effective pathway for Australia 
The Productivity Commission (2014: 2) stresses the urgent need to reform the way 
governments invest in Australian infrastructure, calling for better decision-making, funding and 
financing choices. This imperative applies equally to social housing, where current investment 
strategies are not only unproductive, they are failing to address current and future needs.  
 $-
 $2.0
 $4.0
 $6.0
 $8.0
 $10.0
 $12.0
 $14.0
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 29 30
An
nu
al
 P
ay
m
en
ts
 ($
bi
lli
on
s)
Capital grant Operating subsidy Year
AHURI Final Report No. 315 45 
This Inquiry examined diverse investment pathways that generate social housing. Dominant 
trends in housing policy have favoured demand-side approaches and relied on private financing 
of landlords and increasingly subsidies to investors. This has proven costly for governments and 
ineffective in steering supply, maintaining and retaining outcomes, with too many very low-
income households left unable to access secure affordable housing, homeless or suffering 
severe housing stress in the private rental market. 
Responding to this need inevitably requires resources and some of these can be derived from 
more equitable distribution of assistance than is currently the case. Rebalancing both direct and 
indirect assistance from speculative investors and established home owners to landlords with 
the well-defined social purpose and their tenants would address widespread concerns about 
fairness and inequities in Australian tax and housing assistance policies (Groenhart 2014, 
Duncan, Hodgson et al, 2018). Reforms to capital gains and negative gearing provisions have 
the potential to provide significant additional resources to address substantial levels of housing 
need and enable investment to flow towards the maintenance and expansion of social housing 
(Ecclestone, Verdouw et al. 2018: 34). However, such reforms are far from certain and the case 
for investing in social housing infrastructure should not depend on their progress. 
Unfounded policy assumptions operate as a brake on more effective initiatives to increase the 
supply of social housing and need to be challenged. These include the belief that transferred 
assets will allow private investment to generate new social housing supply, thereby reducing 
public debt and the demand for future subsidies.  
Excessive reliance on commercial finance, of short term and high interest, not only increased 
operating costs for non-government providers in the 2000s, but also increased the 
Commonwealth subsidy they required to meet their operating costs (Lawson, Berry et al, 2014, 
Darcy, 2019, Southern Cross Housing, 2018). For growth the primary motor proved to be public 
equity—most notably and durably under the Social Housing Initiative (KPMG, 2012). During the 
2010s, less efficient private financing dampened the productivity of the social housing sector 
rather than increased it (EY, 2017). Heeding this evidence, the federal government established 
the NHFIC, which is now issuing bonds to provide more efficient longer-term lower-cost loans. 
Early experience of bond issuance (NHFIC, 2019) shows real promise—but financing alone is 
not sufficient to address deep affordability needs. 
In the absence of public equity and operating subsidies, the core purpose of social housing 
provision has drifted ‘upwards’ to serve ‘affordable’ rental tenants and home purchasers 
(Randolph, Troy et al. 2018). So called ‘affordable’ rents, set at 75% market value, are not 
affordable to low income households in most metropolitan markets. There are tenants in 
community housing who remain in housing stress (AIHW, 2018). A subsidy program defining 
‘affordability’ in this way may serve Q2 households, as did NRAS, but will leave the much larger 
group of Q1 households in rental stress (Lawson, Pawson et al, 2018).  
Secondly, state and territory land banking, valuation and planning policies, maximising the value 
of government-owned land, have increased the cost of providing social housing and in turn the 
subsidies required to produce it. Western Australia shows the way in how land bankers can 
work more collaboratively with CHOs to ensure affordable housing outcomes, but more could be 
done on a greater scale and in all jurisdictions (Randolph, Troy et al. 2018).  
Further, some state housing authority strategies are encumbering CHOs with the management 
of public stock that is in poor condition and which in some cases requires sales to cover 
operating costs (as in Tasmania), which could undermine a potentially productive route to new 
supply. Finally, growth reliant on self-financed redevelopment involving demolition, densification 
and sale of units, offers an opportunistic but also finite strategy to increase units of much 
smaller size and higher density. These strategies, as seen in New South Wales and Victoria, 
involve significant community displacement and also pose complex development risks.  
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Overall, recent market-based policy strategies focussing on asset management transfers, 
densification and mixed redevelopment have failed to deliver a sustainable or productive 
pathway for Australian social housing.  
A change in direction is required which not only builds on best past practices but learns the 
lessons of international experience. Strategic long-term public investment is the most effective 
route to boost social housing production. The needs-based capital investment pathway 
recommended by this Inquiry draws on the tools of Australia’s more productive past and builds 
on promising reforms in efficient and mission-driven financing (via NHFIC and CEFC).  
Furthermore, a more effective and joined-up national strategy and regulatory framework can 
ensure a range of social, economic and environmental policy objectives are also achieved, via 
well-designed social housing programs that promote more inclusive housing markets, fairer 
access to opportunities and more energy-efficient living environments. 
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4 Evaluating long-term investment in social housing 
x CBA is widely used to inform infrastructure and policy development, providing 
an estimate of the net benefit to society of a proposal, including social, 
environmental and economic benefits. While CBA is not the only determinant of 
funding and policy decisions, it can provide support in advocating for long-term 
investment in social housing. 
x Methods for applying CBA to social housing are underdeveloped in comparison 
to those used in infrastructure appraisal, particularly for estimating the 
willingness to pay (WTP) for the benefits of housing supply. This is due to social 
housing not being a good freely traded in markets and the prevalence of 
‘intangible’ benefits, such as secure tenure, social inclusion, wellbeing and self-
esteem. While not CBA, recent analyses indicate that providing social housing 
may result in a net savings to government through reduced use of health, justice 
and welfare services.  
x While there is an argument for the development of more detailed methodologies 
for the appraisal of social housing, if CBA is to be used to support the present 
arguments for long-term investment in social housing, a pragmatic approach to 
recommending methodologies is required, drawing on readily available data and 
techniques.  
x Other considerations for recommending CBA methodologies include acceptance 
from decision makers; resource requirements; the communicability of the 
arguments; the relationship between the analytical rigor and support for the 
proposal; and how the method chosen may influence outcomes and 
prioritisations. 
x Given these criteria, we put forward two methods for further investigation as to 
their efficacy in advocating for long-term social housing investment programs. 
 An avoided costs methodology, which is a financial assessment of net savings to 
government of social housing provision due to lower frequency of use of health, justice 
and welfare services. 
 An economic analysis based on the equivalent private market rental value of social 
housing, predicated on the assumption that the rent represents the WTP for the bundle of 
goods provided by the housing (including security, social inclusion, health, access to 
services, amenity and wellbeing). 
x These recommendations should be seen as a starting point for further debate 
within the social housing sector and with government. 
In this chapter we draw on insights from infrastructure appraisal and previous economic 
analyses of social housing, to provide a foundation for the development of suitable methods for 
governments to appraise the effects of more sustained investment in social housing. This 
informs a discussion of various approaches to undertaking a CBA of the 20-year housing 
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construction program outlined in Chapter 3 and recommends useful assessment tools which 
can be used. The recommendations are based on the associated research into frameworks 
through which infrastructure CBA processes might be applied to social housing (Denham, 
Dodson et al. 2019). The selection of CBA as an assessment tool was motivated by the 
common use of this technique in major infrastructure project investment, which is comparable in 
scale to a large public housing investment program.  
In theory, CBA can account for the economic, social and environmental benefits of social 
housing, if appropriate methods for monetising the benefits of the program and life-cycle 
assessments of building costs are applied. However, there have been infrequent and often 
partial attempts to undertake CBA of social housing programs, as there is no agreement on, or 
an obvious methodology for, determining the WTP for social housing, or the range of social 
benefits it delivers. While there is a substantial body of literature on the benefits of social 
housing, there has been scant attention paid to an economic assessment of these benefits 
(Buzzelli 2009), and the benefits are both multifaceted and interrelated (Kraatz and Thomson 
2016). The consideration of CBA methodologies and monetisation appropriate to evaluation of a 
long-term housing development program is a central concern of this chapter.  
4.1 Cost-benefit analysis (CBA) 
Commonly used in public sector decision-making, CBA is a method based in welfare economics 
and used to capture the net social benefit of proposals. It is concerned with estimating the net 
benefit to the whole of society as a result of an initiative, accounting for the full (external) costs 
and benefits of the intervention. It can also be used to assess the worth of the outcome of a 
large program against a do-nothing option or alternatives. CBA is distinct from financial 
analysis, which is concerned with investment pathways and the budget impacts of undertaking a 
program, as discussed in Chapter 3. While both of these aspects are typically included in a 
business case, financial analysis is generally separate from CBA for public projects because 
governments typically decide whether to proceed or not based on the prospects of net social 
benefit rather than profitability. In general, CBA indicates whether a project is worth proceeding 
with in terms of overall (external) value to society, while financing appraisal assesses how best 
to assemble the funds required to undertake the project and the (internal) return.  
Proponents of CBA posit that this technique can account for economic, social and 
environmental outcomes through methods of monetising the costs and benefits: it uses 
economics as a method rather than the focus (Ergas 2009). Monetisation of benefits is based 
on the concept of ‘willingness to pay’ (WTP) for the good or service provided. The difference 
between the society-wide aggregate WTP and the amount actually paid is the ‘consumer 
surplus’, which is compared to project delivery and external costs to derive the key reporting 
statistics of net present value and benefit-cost ratio. Most CBAs occur over extended time 
frames, with 30 years standard for infrastructure, such that discount rates are used to reduce 
the impact of future costs and benefits, reflecting assumed social preferences for consumption 
today over consumption in the future.  
Finally, it should be noted that many forms of social infrastructure, such as schools, justice 
facilities and hospitals, are not subject to economic appraisal and thus do not provide examples 
of how social outcomes can be monetised. This observation demonstrates that a business case 
is not a compulsory step for governments towards funding these facilities. Furthermore, 
announcements of major transport projects are often made prior to any CBA, indicating that 
while economic analysis provides support for initiative, political will is an important factor in 
securing funding. Thus, CBA provides a useful, but not always decisive, input to the political 
decision-making process around whether to proceed with a given program or project. This 
caveat would necessarily apply to any government decision to proceed with a major long-term 
social housing construction program.  
AHURI Final Report No. 315 49 
4.1.1 CBA methodologies evolve through practice 
Business cases and CBA are typically conducted together. A business case sets out the 
supporting rationale for a project in terms of public policy and financial viability, while CBA 
contributes to a business case by assessing the net public value of a project. Business cases, 
and particularly CBA, are complex and intensive technical analyses that have developed over 
many decades in response to long-term high-value programs of government investment. Today, 
independent authorities, such as the federal Infrastructure Australia and its state equivalents, 
rely on these tools to assess project priorities. The structure of business cases is similar across 
jurisdictions, including problem definition, options assessment, as well as detailed cost-benefit 
and financial analyses.  
There is an important nexus between funding, the development of methodologies for appraisal, 
and increasing focus on productivity within the ecosystem of public investment appraisal. 
Infrastructure CBA has been evolving since the 1950s during a period of continual investment in 
freeway networks and transport systems, having developed frameworks, expertise and 
stakeholders. This has involved an iterative process of funding, construction, appraisal, and 
review and refinement of assessment techniques, which has informed parameter and 
methodological improvement and enabled a body of expertise to develop.  
In contrast, there has been underinvestment in social housing since the early-1980s, and there 
is a corresponding lack of development of relevant methodologies for assessing the economic 
and social costs and benefits of social housing. In addition, several aspects of social housing 
make CBA less suitable as an appraisal technique. Unlike a utility or transport link, social 
housing is not a good that is openly priced or freely traded in markets; social tenants are 
typically low income and their willingness to pay for housing is necessarily constrained such that 
this demand cannot be easily estimated through conventional monetisation methodologies. 
While transport CBA easily monetises the benefits of an infrastructure link via such approaches 
as travel time savings, the development of clear and appropriate methodologies for monetising 
the benefits of social housing, while possible, have so far proven elusive. Moreover, the limited 
demand for their application has meant examples of social housing CBA are rare. The housing 
sector would be commencing from a position of relative conceptual and methodological deficit if 
it was to begin applying CBA to social housing as infrastructure.  
4.1.2 CBA as an input to decision making 
An extensive review of Australian infrastructure business case and CBA processes undertaken 
for this Inquiry (Denham, Dodson and Lawson, 2019) provides the following insights for social 
housing. 
x Infrastructure appraisal and CBA are custom in nature and designed to fit the initiative being 
appraised.  
x CBA methodologies reflect long-term, iterative development processes.13 
x Infrastructure appraisal is concerned with individual projects, such as a specific road or rail 
line, rather than overarching policy positions. 
x CBA is only one part of the decision-making process, particularly where there are 
considerable costs and benefits that cannot be monetised.  
                                               
 
13 For example, central infrastructure and transport agencies maintain and distribute guidelines and parameters 
for transport appraisal, such as the Australian Transport Assessment and Planning (ATAP) Guidelines. 
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x Based on the review of infrastructure decision-making, CBA is more frequently used to 
provide support for decisions already taken, rather than as the basis for changing existing 
standpoints.14 
4.1.3 Examples of social housing CBA in Australia 
While there is an extensive literature on the benefits associated with adequate housing, and 
social housing provision, there are few examples of CBA application or the monetisation of 
benefits as normally required in CBA. This is most likely due to the difficulty of quantifying and 
monetising the range of non-market traded benefits that accrue from social housing, such as 
wellbeing, security, participation in education and employment, and social inclusion.  
For the appraisal of a long-term social housing project, more detailed methods of CBA can be 
seen as trading off efficacy for generalisability, as the results are specific to the cohorts involved 
in the program. As a result, it is likely that monetisation methods for a CBA of a long-term social 
housing project should be abstract and generalizable—such as the use of market rents as an 
estimation of housing benefits used in earlier appraisals of social housing (Pugh and Catt 1984; 
Carter, Milligan et al. 1988). 
A summary of CBA methods, of varying scale and scope, which have been applied to social 
housing, is provided in Table 8. 
                                               
 
14 For example, there is a tendency for major transport projects to be announced by governments, or promised 
by oppositions, without being subject to rigorous technical and economic analysis (Terrill, Emslie et al. 2016; 
Terrill and Ha 2018). 
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Of the examples given in Table 8, the broad-scale analyses are the most applicable to 
supporting the argument for a long-term social housing program. The use of private market 
rental values as a measure of the benefits of social housing is straightforward in 
implementation; however, interviews undertaken for this research indicate that the underlying 
assumptions may not be accepted by government.  
The housing program assessments are the opposite, as they are resource-intensive in 
implementation, but less abstract in conception. The CBAs of housing programs by Witte (2017) 
and Johnson, Kuehnle et al. (2014) provide detailed methodologies, but the results may not be 
generalizable, as required for assessing a nation-wide intervention. This is also the case for the 
economics of program evaluation approach of Prentice and Scutella (2018), which notes that 
the results are not widely applicable.  
The avoided costs methods are a notable development in mounting arguments for investing in 
social housing, given their support from within social housing agencies as well as academic 
literature. The research using this methodology, as summarised here, has been focussed on the 
government budget benefits of providing housing for the homeless, indicating further research 
would be required to develop an understanding of how the use of government services changes 
with different cohorts.  
4.1.4 Scale of analysis: moving from projects to programs  
The National Disability Insurance Scheme (NDIS) is an appropriate example of program 
assessment for comparison to this Inquiry’s projected housing construction program, due to the 
scale of both programs and the predominance of expected non-market benefits (Productivity 
Commission 2017b). To inform the Commonwealth Government’s decision to implement the 
NDIS, the Productivity Commission (2011) undertook an inquiry into disability support in 
Australia.  
The inquiry included a basic plausibility test, in lieu of a full CBA, due to the number of 
intangible benefits. The plausibility test involves: 
x consideration of the costs of the scheme (using the conventional cost-benefit framework for 
measuring these) and identification of the value of the benefits per scheme participant that 
would be required to just outweigh these 
x making a judgment on whether the measure of benefits derived from the above calculation 
passes a credibility test, taking into account the wide set of benefits described above 
(Productivity Commission 2011: 954).  
The commission qualitatively considered a range of benefits in detail—including the welfare 
gain of transfers from the well off to the needy, employment impacts for carers and participants, 
and reduction in costs to government—and compares them to the estimated cost per 
participant. The conclusion was that: 
… the NDIS would only have to produce an annual gain of $3,800 per participant to 
meet a cost-benefit test. Given the scope of the benefits, that test would be passed 
easily. (Productivity Commission 2011: 941).  
This example is notable for its use of a method that sidesteps the monetisation of intangible 
benefits, through a judgement of probability that the proposal will result in net benefits given the 
costs per participant. It also illustrates the importance of political will in ushering through major 
social policy, as the NDIS has benefited from bipartisan support in the Commonwealth sphere. 
The NBN is another example of a CBA approach used for a major nation-wide public 
infrastructure investment program. The scheme was initially promoted under Labor, who 
claimed that an Australia-specific CBA was a waste of time as, ‘(c)ost-benefit analyses have 
been performed into broadband networks all round the world and all had been overwhelmingly 
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positive’ (SMH 2010). However, under pressure from the opposition, the government eventually 
commissioned a CBA for the project in 2014. Four NBN options were included in the analysis: 
no further rollout, unsubsidised rollout, a multi-technology mix, and fibre to the premises. Choice 
modelling techniques were used to estimate WTP for different levels of broadband services, as 
well as for home and commercial uses (Department of Communications and Vertigan 2014).  
4.2 Approaches to evaluation 
4.2.1 Program scale and market effects 
The scale of a proposed social housing program to address both the backlog of need 
(433,000 dwellings) and needs arising in the next 20 years (727,000) has been outlined in 
Lawson, Pawson et al. (2018) and summarised here in Chapter 3. Construction would be 
spread on a proportional and needs basis over the 20-year program, rather than in fixed annual 
increments.  
An annual construction target could be set annually, beginning at 20,000 dwellings in Year 1 
and rising over time to 60,000 in Year 20, achieved through a 5 per cent increase in total social 
housing stock per year. Table 9, below, shows the total cost to government of Scenario 5—
involving a capital grant subsidy model with interest rate deductions from NHFIC financing and 
no CRA—which produces the lowest cost outcome of all scenarios, at $9.0 billion per annum 
over 20 years, compared with $11.8 billion for Scenario 1. 
Table 9: Program-level annual costings for capital grant subsidy model with interest rate 
deductions and no CRA 
Program summary  Year 1 NPV 
total ($)  
Per dwelling 
average ($) 
20-year annual 
average ($) 
Total development costs  
(excl. GST and taxes) 
5.4 billion  268,000  9.7 billion  
Total operating costs 2.8 billion  137,000  5.0 billion  
Rental income 3.2 billion  157,000  5.7 billion  
Capital grants 5.0 billion   247,000  9.0 billion  
CRA payments - - - 
Government subsidy 5.0 billion  247,000  9.0 billion  
Source: Lawson, Pawson et al. (2018). 
The scale of the projected housing need adds complexity to the appraisal, as CBA is, ‘[most] 
appropriate where the broader environment (e.g. the price of goods and services in the 
economy) can be assumed to be unchanged by the intervention’ (HM Treasury 2018: 21). A 
large-scale program such as the one recommended here is likely to have an inflationary effect 
on construction prices, particularly in markets such as Sydney, where the RBA (2018) have 
reported that the construction sector is reaching capacity and the projected social housing 
program is for 140,000 dwellings over 20 years. Such a significant addition of housing within the 
affordable sector may have an impact on rental markets, creating further issues when 
subjecting such a program to CBA. In addition, for small social housing projects, particularly 
those that aim to deal with specific sections of the community with housing needs, assumptions 
of equivalent marginal benefits and costs per dwelling are justified. However, for larger housing 
construction programs that assumption would not hold: marginal benefits per dwelling would 
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decline over time as the construction program proceeded and those with less acute needs were 
provided with housing (Denham, Dodson et al. 2019).  
This should not be taken as a criticism of the housing program, rather as a caution that 
programs of this scale have implications for CBA and the estimation of costs and benefits. A 
recent development in appraisal methodologies reflects these issues in undertaking CBA for 
market-shaping programs, recommending mission-orientated appraisals for projects that focus 
on ‘innovation, spill over effects and systemic changes’ (Kattel, Mazzacuto et al. 2018: 21). 
However, this methodology is not currently in use in Australian policy and project appraisal. 
4.2.2 Benefit estimation methods 
For undertaking a CBA, estimating the WTP for the benefits of social housing requires the use 
of modelling or experiment techniques. The range of CBA methods, discussed in Section 4.1.3, 
indicates that there is not a single agreed approach to benefits estimation, with different 
methods chosen depending on the purpose of the CBA and the data available. Table 10, on the 
following page, introduces benefit monetisation methods that could be considered for 
undertaking the CBA of social housing.  
4.2.3 Avoided costs 
The avoided costs approach to benefit estimation is a financial appraisal method that estimates 
a budget outcome as a result of housing provision, based on a comparison of the cost of 
provision with savings through avoiding costs associated with the frequency of use of other 
services. Research indicates that social housing is likely to provide a net benefit to whole-of-
government budgets (Parsell, Petersen et al. 2016; Witte 2017; Wood, Flatau et al. 2016), and 
signals to treasuries and other agencies the fiscal savings that provision of housing may 
achieve for other portfolios. Therefore, this approach aligns with government objectives of ‘living 
within their means’, as discussed in Chapter 2.  
While this may be seen as a positive advance in terms of funding support for the sector, Parsell, 
Petersen and Culhane (2016: 1549) caution that avoided costs should be used ‘to augment 
more fundamental arguments for ensuring that chronically excluded individuals are able to 
access secure housing, such as through enabling greater participation in society’. In this regard, 
they fall short of theoretical, ideal CBA methodology that accounts for social and environmental 
impacts as well as economic outcomes. 
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4.2.4 Plausibility test 
The plausibility test, used by the Productivity Commission for the NDIS, could be used to 
support the argument for a program of social housing construction. As for the NDIS, the 
appraisal would be based on the difference between the tangible costs and benefits, as 
described in the avoided costs model (above). This would provide the basis for a judgement on 
whether the intangible benefits are likely to result in a net benefit to society. This plausibility test 
reflects the view expressed by a public servant interviewed for this research, that: 
… there are aspects that aren’t able to be quantified, but it is still very important to 
apply a rigorous analytical framework to those non-quantifiable benefits and express 
them in a way that is useful for decision makers so they can weigh them up alongside 
the results of the more formal CBA. 
This type of approach was also mentioned in interviews by public servants involved in policy 
analysis. They expressed a view that decisions on projects with unquantifiable benefits were 
based on a judgement as to whether those benefits were likely to be greater than the difference 
between costs and the quantifiable benefits. This approach was seen as a way to minimise 
uncertainty when making a decision.  
4.2.5 Strategic assessment 
The past year has seen an emerging practice in which strategic assessments are used to offer 
initial appraisal of infrastructure projects to support announcements by decision makers. These 
strategic assessments are not as detailed as a full business case, but rather appear designed to 
offer support to decisions that have already been made by political representatives in advance 
of a full business case and CBA. In Victoria, two recent major projects have been promoted on 
the basis of a strategic assessment: the $11 billion Melbourne Airport Rail Link (MARL), and the 
$50 billion Suburban Rail Loop (SRL). These strategic assessments are essentially a multi-
criteria analysis (MCA), used to determine which of the options considered proceeds to an 
extensive business case and CBA.  
The use of strategic assessment as a preliminary step in infrastructure development processes 
provides a rationale for proceeding with a project prior to the completion of a full business case 
in which enumeration of the economic costs and benefits is undertaken. Such strategic 
analyses can be seen as a response to the common criticism of governments committing to and 
proceeding with projects prior to CBAs. However, as Ergas (2009: 34) astutely observes: 
… it is difficult to see how one could determine that an MCA assessment was wrong 
after the fact. This may be a reason why MCA is gaining popularity—as a device for 
reducing accountability for decisions. 
Strategic assessment may be useful as a preliminary step towards social housing investment, 
as it clearly demonstrates the pros and cons of options against the key considerations and 
objectives of the proposal. Therefore, it provides a platform to elucidate the issues associated 
with the undersupply of social housing, as well as an assessment of the strategic options 
available to mitigate these issues. The standard process for MCA uses a workshop format, 
which could provide an opportunity to gather key social housing stakeholders to consider the 
options, with the prospect that the process will garner additional support for housing investment. 
Given the current underdevelopment of standardised data and techniques to undertake CBA for 
social housing, a strategic analysis of the form applied for MARL and SRL may offer a suitable 
initial grounding for decisions to proceed with major social housing projects.  
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4.2.6 Additional analyses 
A program of works  
Given the scale of the proposal and the issues with declining marginal benefits associated with 
prioritarian allocation of housing, a logical approach to undertaking a CBA would be to assess 
regions individually, by reframing the proposal from a project to a ‘program of works’. CBA 
would follow the policy decision, which may be informed by a plausibility test or strategic 
assessment, and provide guidance on prioritising developments. This would tie local-demand 
information more closely to construction estimates, and also provide insight into the staging of 
development as each area would have a net present value (NPV) associated with its projected 
social housing need (taking into account the proposed program targeting of investment where 
needed and gap finance to suit land and construction costs).  
Computable general equilibrium modelling 
Computable general equilibrium (CGE) modelling is used to estimate the economic effects of a 
proposal based on the production relationships between sectors of the economy. As a 
computationally complex process, CGE modelling of proposals is undertaken by few 
organisations in Australia. The Centre of Policy Studies’ (n.d.) MONASH model has been used 
in Australia since 1993 and can compare ‘with’ and ‘without’ scenarios by industries, 
commodities, occupations and regions within Australia. The modelling of interactions between 
industries is useful in that it will: 
… generate insights into the effects of policies and other shocks in the areas of trade, 
taxation, public expenditure, social security, demography, immigration, technology, 
labour markets, environment, resources, infrastructure and major-project 
expenditures, natural and man-made disasters, and financial crises. CGE modelling is 
the only practical way of quantifying these effects on industries, occupations, regions 
and socioeconomic groups (Dixon and Jorgenson 2012: 1). 
CGE is different to CBA, in that it doesn’t indicate net social benefit and indicate whether it is 
worthwhile to proceed, but rather estimates the employment generated and the net change in 
GDP as a result of the program. CGE is of note in this context as it may provide insights into the 
cross-sectorial, economy-wide effects of the scale of housing investment proposed.  
4.2.7 Economic cost 
Regardless of the approach taken to appraise the social housing proposal, estimates for the 
costs of delivery, maintenance and administration are required in order to calculate the net 
present value. Estimates of the costs for the program are detailed in Chapter 3. The costs range 
from $146,000 per dwelling in regional South Australia to $614,000 in Sydney, with an average 
of $270,000. The cost estimations take into account the expected dwelling type required. 
Operating costs per unit have been estimated at $6,904. These estimates are based on 
individual construction rates and do not take into account that a construction program of this 
size may have inflationary effects. Furthermore, the likelihood that economies of scale may 
reduce the cost per dwelling to below estimates, and that costs may reduce over time due to 
increasing efficiencies in materials and production methods, are also not taken into account.  
The cost estimate would also need to take into account the deadweight loss of taxation—which 
is when ‘a government’s ability to re-distribute income through non-distortionary means is 
limited, the distributive effects of a government project should be taken into account’ (Stiglitz 
2000: 274). For example, the NBN CBA above used a deadweight loss of 24 cents per dollar, to 
reflect the loss in GDP due to additional taxation required to finance the project (Department of 
Communications and Vertigan 2014).  
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As it is expected that the construction program would be undertaken over a 20-year period, a 
proposed schedule of works would be required. The year-by-year construction program, with 
associated costs by location and maintenance would then have an appropriate discount rate 
applied, to reflect the social preference of current over future consumption. However, the 
appropriate discount rate to use in this case is contested, both in terms of methods for 
calculating and when applied to outcomes (Moore, Boardman et al. 2004; Harrison 2010). In 
practice, most Australian infrastructure agencies and state treasuries use an SDR of 7 per cent, 
with sensitivity analysis undertaken at 4 per cent and 10 per cent. The discount rate should also 
be applied to the benefits as they accrue over time. 
4.3 A pragmatic approach 
The central question is how to approach a CBA for a long-term investment in a social housing 
program. As contended in Chapter 2, it is possible to conceptualise social housing as 
infrastructure, which indicates that investment in housing supply may be argued for through the 
use of infrastructure evaluation methods. Alternatively, social housing could be seen as a policy 
position, which may lead to the use of different appraisal methods, as employed by the Office of 
Best Practice Regulation (2016); or as a public health intervention, in which case statistical 
measures of the value of life (AIHW 2016) could be applied.  
As discussed in more detail in the associated report by Denham, Dodson et al. (2019), the 
method and conceptualisation for a CBA of social housing needs to take into account: 
x the preferences and requirements of the audience for the analysis, and thus its usefulness 
in increasing funding to the sector 
x the need for costs of developing and implementing the methodology to be in proportion to 
the resources and capacity of the sector 
x whether the conceptual basis for the argument is clear and easily communicated 
x that the level of analytical rigor required by decision makers appears to be inversely 
correlated to their degree of support for the proposition 
x how the method chosen may affect the outcomes of the appraisal and how it may lead to 
prioritising certain outcomes over others. 
The points are important in determining a way forward, as if governments and treasuries do not 
accept the analysis, or question the validity of the underlying assumptions, then it is unlikely that 
the CBA will be an effective advocacy tool. In this respect, it is important that any analysis of a 
long-term housing development program should form part of a larger advocacy and decision-
making process undertaken in conjunction with government agencies. 
Given these criteria, the use of avoided cost models may prove the most beneficial, particularly 
as they have been positively received by state treasuries. They are conceptually transparent, 
designed to estimate whether providing people with houses costs less than the health, justice 
and welfare service requirements if they are homeless or living with critical housing needs. As 
avoided cost models are already in development within state housing departments, the resource 
requirements would seem to be reasonable. It should be noted, however, that avoided cost 
models are not a form of economic analysis—they provide a within-government budget 
outcome, rather than an estimate of the net benefit to society and social housing tenants (as a 
CBA would).  
A further option is a hybrid approach, redolent of the plausibility test used in the Productivity 
Commission (2011) appraisal of disability insurance, where the results of an avoided cost 
method could be used to argue for net gains to social welfare based on the likelihood that 
unquantified benefits are greater than any deficit. This is an example of a pragmatic approach to 
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CBA, using a method that reflects the information at hand and the need for assurance that the 
program is of net social benefit, rather than providing a quantified benefit-cost ratio and estimate 
of net-present value over the expected life of the asset. 
There are alternate approaches to developing business cases for social housing. The ‘avoided 
cost’ approach to social housing business cases that has begun to be used by social housing 
agencies offers estimates of whole-of-government fiscal savings across portfolios other than 
housing, as a result of social housing provision, and thus avoids the issues of monetisation of 
‘intangible’ dimensions of housing that a CBA would typically seek to calculate. This method has 
been developed within the social housing agencies and has been positively received by 
Treasuries. For social housing as a welfare intervention, a conceptualisation as a public health 
intervention—or considering the value the wider community places on providing housing for 
those in need—may provide better outcomes than an infrastructure conceptualisation. 
If a CBA for a long-term social housing construction program is to be undertaken, then the 
logical way forward is to utilise the market rental values methodology, with the caveat that 
government support for this approach would need to be assured. Market rental value methods 
enable an economic valuation of the infrastructure created as a result of the construction 
program, regardless of the occupant. This approach would require theoretical exposition but, as 
noted previously, real estate values and price modelling techniques are widely available. 
Therefore, this method has the advantage of being ready to implement in the short term, 
particularly compared to those models that would require further data collection and analysis. 
These recommendations are pragmatic, in that the methods proposed can provide timely 
support for long-term social housing development programs, with minimal need for development 
of data and methodology. They are provided here as a starting point for debate within the social 
housing sector and with government. There is need for further development of social housing 
appraisal methodologies, to ensure that these methods meet the expectations of those who are 
likely to provide funding for the proposed program. 
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5 The way forward: policy development 
Housing plays a foundational role in our health, security and stability, and enables us to flourish 
as individuals, enjoy family life and take part in our community. Housing and related policies 
influence our access to resources and can either strengthen social inclusion or drive inequality 
and socio-spatial polarisation. Today, many Australian households do not have access to safe, 
affordable or secure housing. High housing costs and fixed or stagnant incomes have 
generated considerable housing-related stress. This phenomenon has consequences not only 
for the individuals involved but also for governments—providing emergency shelter, related 
health care, as well as remedial education and justice services—and impacts the broader 
economy. Better access to safe, secure and affordable housing would improve long-term social 
and economic wellbeing and relieve burdens on social service providers; however, such a far-
sighted and holistic view is rarely accounted for in government budgets. 
Social housing is an essential form of infrastructure that provides safe, secure and affordable 
housing on the basis of need. This Inquiry has quantified the level of investment required for 
social housing to address current and future needs. It established that there is a significant 
backlog in the provision of social housing (433,400 dwellings) based on evidence of manifest 
need (homeless households) and evident need (very low-income households paying more than 
30% of their income on private rents). Without a major change in market conditions and policy 
reform, this need is predicted to grow to 727,300 dwellings by 2036.  
Addressing the social housing shortfall challenges ambitious governments to shape better 
housing markets for all. Mission-orientated public investment is a proven and effective tool to 
drive innovation in housing supply and address the challenge of housing affordability and 
climate change. Experience of PFI schemes and PPPs has proven them to be costly and 
inflexible. A needs-based capital (NBC) investment strategy can directly support more inclusive 
living environments and foster economic stability and growth. As our modelling clearly shows, it 
is also less of a drain on the public purse.  
5.1 The reform process 
A national social housing reform process needs to be accompanied by a shift in the ways in 
which governments and key stakeholders talk and think about housing. As this report has 
demonstrated, there are significant complexities involved in compiling a robust, costed case for 
social housing investment. Even if the case for investment were successfully made, there are 
substantial institutional barriers that would work against a radical change in funding levels for 
social housing. These barriers include: the established processes by which government budgets 
are formulated, the politicisation of the budget position (surplus or deficit), reliance on market 
forces (enabled by tax, credit and land policies) and a bias against more purposeful ‘market-
shaping’ role for government. Despite these barriers, social housing’s contribution to social 
wellbeing, economic stability and sustainability requires a more prominent and firmly assured 
place in Australian public policy. A more ambitious and positive view of social housing can open 
up discursive space within which the more technical requirements of changes to processes and 
institutions may gain traction, as outlined in Figure 10. 
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Figure 10: Foundations of a national needs-based capital (NBC) investment strategy for 
social housing 
Source: Authors. 
5.1.1 Changing the conversation: market shaping to promote social wellbeing  
Political leaders, policy-makers and other key stakeholders need to advance arguments that 
specifically and actively engage with and support direct government involvement in the 
provision of social (public and community) and affordable housing. The case for, and the cost-
effectiveness of, this involvement is set out in earlier chapters of this report. We acknowledge 
that, to some extent, such a strategy runs counter to faith in the operation of ‘free’ markets, but 
these very processes in Australia are undermining both social cohesion and economic 
productivity. This orthodox thinking relying on market forces that has pervaded Australian 
housing policy forms one of the barriers to effective institutional change and strategic policy 
reform. However, there are signs that the discourse which has underpinned a ‘hands off’ policy 
role is changing and a more concerted market shaping approach is becoming more acceptable 
(Commonwealth Government and the State of Victoria, 2018:3-4). In order to better serve the 
long-term interests of the Australian community, a broader based consensus can be built 
around the following points. 
x Housing in Australia fills a societal purpose. This includes its historical role accommodating 
the broadest possible spectrum of the Australian workforce, including low-waged workers, 
but it extends further than this. With stable, secure and affordable housing, all Australians 
will be able to thrive, socially, economically and culturally, and this is an essential 
foundation for ensuring Australia’s future as a strong, healthy and cohesive society. 
x There is manifest housing market failure in many parts of Australia. A widening group of 
Australians have no reasonable prospect of being suitably accommodated through the 
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private housing market, for a range of reasons including: affordability barriers, absolute or 
relative supply shortfalls, discrimination, or requirement for a modified living environment.  
x Although the causal mechanisms are complex, housing underpins the achievement of many 
individual, social and economic goals. Investment in housing must be a priority for 
governments. Properly directed, such investment has the potential to contribute to national 
growth and wellbeing at levels that far exceed the perceived benefits accruing from fiscal 
constraint and budget surpluses. 
5.1.2 Purposeful investment: monitor need, fund adequately and regulate well 
International organisations increasingly call for more effective public investment and efficient 
financing of infrastructure, stressing greater capacity in needs-based planning, securing and 
allocating adequate funds, and designing and implementing programs (IMF 2015). Mission-
focussed public investment not only addresses market failure but also creates value (rather than 
extracts it). It can also stimulate innovation and promote inclusive growth (Mazzucato 2018).  
For all Australian governments to play a more effective role in addressing housing needs, 
procuring funds and ensuring their effective use, it is vital that a national housing body be 
established within government, which has high-level expertise, legitimate authority and ongoing 
policy steering capacity. 
The role of the national housing authority would encompass the following. 
Box 3: The role of a national housing authority 
x Compile and disseminate evidence to guide housing policy and assistance reforms to 
deliver better access to safe, secure and affordable housing, and promote more inclusive, 
productive and environmentally sustainable cities. 
x Provide clear and consistent evidence for the level and type of housing needs in different 
markets over time to inform supply strategies for all levels of government, industry and 
communities. This independent public authority would also take advice from an expert 
advisory council involving civil society, housing industry and social service organisations. 
x Develop and update rigorous and reliable cost benchmarks, industry standards to 
promote decent housing standards, appropriate innovation and effective delivery.  
x Use the above data on housing need, land and construction costs to set targets for social 
housing provision and secure necessary capital investment, to be specified in 
intergovernmental agreements (e.g. NHHA and bilateral agreements), key performance 
indicators and task orientated budgetary reports.  
x Facilitate best practice in strategic land policy and urban planning that addresses the 
need for residential land at the metropolitan level and in local communities.  
x Join up related policy strategies to maximise social housing outcomes: integrate state 
planning reforms with NHHA supply targets, calibrate required capital subsidies with 
costs required for CH and NDIS accommodation to reflect the scale, distribution and 
complexity of needs, drive down the cost of procurement through more effective land 
policies; and source more efficient financing via the NHFIC and CEFC.  
x Increase government accountability by incorporating progress on the achievement of 
housing needs and supply targets in budgetary reporting at the federal, state and local 
level.  
x Ensure public investments are used appropriately and effectively via effective regulation 
of and reporting by state housing authorities, land developers, constructors and CHOs.  
x Recommend to government further actions to promote more effective housing outcomes 
to achieve national housing strategy objectives, based on research and consultation 
involving consumers and other appropriate stakeholders. 
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The authority’s expertise and capacity to quantify need and procurement costs would provide an 
informed and transparent foundation for Australian governments to develop, advocate for and 
implement regional capital investment programs to complement NHHA, NHFIC, CEFC and 
NDIS funding and financing.  
Our Inquiry’s assessment methodology provides a geographically disaggregated basis for 
modelling the relative cost-effectiveness of different approaches to the deployment of 
government support for housing investment (i.e. different ‘investment pathways’). While 
attempting to build on the work of others, our approach to estimating backlog and newly 
emerging need was subject to time and resource constraints. Although this Inquiry’s model 
offers a credible approach within these limitations, the refinement of a sophisticated housing 
needs assessment methodology and its institutionalisation remains an outstanding challenge.  
Notwithstanding the fact that the precise magnitude and geography of need requires refinement, 
heads of treasuries, housing providers and patient investors agree on the existence of a funding 
gap in social housing created by persistently low rent revenues relative to the cost of provision 
(AHWG 2017; ISA 2017).  
It is widely accepted that more efficient NHFIC financing than has been commercially available, 
has reduced the cost of debt for CHOs (NHFIC 2019 EY 2017; Lawson, Berry et al. 2014). Yet 
debt is not a replacement for funding. Governments now appreciate (AHWG, 2017, NSWFHA 
2016) that for CHOs to accommodate low income households, there is a real funding gap which 
must be addressed.  
We have demonstrated that this gap can be filled in a variety of ways, from up front public 
equity, through to long term operating cost payments for privately financed developments. Our 
research shows that direct and purposeful capital investment can be significantly more cost 
efficient in both the medium and long term. It is provides the strongest mechanism to influence 
the scale, location and quality of housing produced. It can also ensure that dwellings remain as 
social housing over time (compare for example the long term housing outcomes of the SHI with 
NRAS).  
Detailed financial modelling based on real costs (Lawson, Pawson et al. 2018) shows that 
commercially financed developments, funded via rents, operating subsidies and CRA, are 
substantially more expensive for governments in the medium to long term. For a social housing 
program of sufficient scale, privately financed concession payment models present a 24% 
greater cost to the public purse in the first year alone. Private equity alternatives promoted by 
some industry funds (ISA, 2017) demand much higher rates of return on equity (8% plus) than 
public equity, again driving up operating costs and consequently government subsidies. 
For low income households adrift in Australia’s private rental market, CRA is clearly not 
sufficient, especially in metropolitan areas.17 A social housing investment program, which 
combines cost effective and strategic needs based capital (NBC) and more efficient NHFIC 
finance, can better address the needs of households for whom the private rental market offers 
no hope of security or affordability.  
Direct investment in social housing ensures there is a secure affordable alternative for 
vulnerable households. It can address discrimination when age or disability could close the 
door. It can provide an oasis for households fleeing domestic violence and a stable home for 
children to flourish and complete their education. Direct investment can also contribute to better 
design outcomes and ensure economic stability when a market downturn threatens. Further, 
                                               
 
17 In 2015–16, 41.2 per cent of CRA recipients remained in housing stress after receiving CRA (Productivity 
Commission 2017a: Table GA.27; see also AHURI 2017b). 
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joined-up strategies can demonstrate how accessible design and energy efficiency can deliver 
more socially inclusive and sustainable environments (NDIS 2018; CEFC 2016b).  
It has been suggested by other AHURI research (Eccleston, Verdouw et al. 2018) that reform of 
existing housing assistance instruments in the tax system would make available a substantial 
pool of funding that could be redirected towards delivering more appropriate housing outcomes. 
This may well be true. However, in any plausible reform scenario, the need for extensive social 
housing investment will remain—and the deployment of such support should not rest on the 
generation of savings from other measures.  
Given the substantial public investment required for the effective reform of social housing, 
strong oversight of procurement strategies is vital to ensure that subsidies are invested 
efficiently, effectively and equitably. National Housing and Homelessness Agreements and their 
bilateral can provide important frameworks, targets and program guidelines. Investment in well-
regulated NFP and public providers inhibits the potential for funds to be extracted for 
inappropriate purposes. In the Netherlands, Austria, Finland and many other countries with 
successful social housing systems, NFP legislation enforces the purpose and operating 
principles of these organisations and the conditions for use of subsidies and tax incentives. 
More detailed investigations are required to strengthen the ongoing development of Australia’s 
National Regulatory System for Community Housing. 
5.1.3 More appropriate appraisal of societal benefits 
Business cases, and CBA in particular, are conventionally used to underpin infrastructure 
investment decision-making, but have rarely been applied to large long-term programs such as 
social housing. CBA provides an assessment of whether a project is of net benefit to society, 
including social and environmental outcomes as well as economic ones.  
In Australia, the most prominent use of CBA is in the assessment of transport infrastructure, and 
it is guided by state and federal infrastructure bodies, as well as technical guidelines and 
parameters published by a central agency. However, CBA should not be seen as the only basis 
for infrastructure decision-making in Australia. Recent development decisions in the transport 
sector in particular have been made on political foundations rather than on the basis of CBA. In 
addition, other forms of social infrastructure, such as schools and hospitals, are not subject to 
business case assessment or CBA. Further, large-scale interventions and market innovations, 
such as the NBN and NDIS, are based on wider societal benefits. This indicates that while CBA 
can provide reassurance to governments of the net benefit to society of a particular project, it 
tends not to be applied to long-term market-shaping interventions and cannot be expected to 
change policy positions without the support of other forms of advocacy. 
While there has been recent interest in developing methodologies for applying CBA to social 
housing, methods are underdeveloped in comparison to transport projects. There is no 
consensus on how best to monetise the benefits of housing. This can be seen as a reflection of 
the multifaceted and interrelated benefits of social housing, many of which are regarded as 
‘intangible’ within these studies.  
Whichever appraisal methodology is developed and applied will influence outcomes and funding 
priorities. If CBA and business case methodologies are to be used to support the long-term 
social housing development program, much work will need to be done to establish suitable 
approaches to the assessment of costs and benefits, and appropriate longitudinal data 
collected. These approaches must also be acceptable to decision makers and be able to 
influence funding for the sector. They will need to address the gap in expertise and resources 
required to develop and implement CBA, and provide the conceptual clarity, analytical guidance 
and rigor expected by decision makers.  
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While there are arguments for developing CBA methodologies that directly apply to social 
housing outcomes (see Denham, Dodson et al. 2019), we propose a more pragmatic approach. 
This approach assesses appraisal methodologies based on efficacy, resource requirements and 
the need to provide support for a long-term social housing development now, rather than after 
years of subsequent research and data collection.  
This Inquiry recommends two methodologies for the supporting appraisal of the proposed social 
housing development program. 
x An avoided costs methodology, which is a financial assessment of net savings to 
government of social housing provision due to lower frequency of use of health, justice and 
welfare services. 
x An economic analysis based on the equivalent private market rental value of social housing, 
predicated on the assumption that the rent represents the Willingness to Pay (WTP) for the 
bundle of goods provided by the housing (including security, social inclusion, health, access 
to services, amenity and wellbeing).  
These recommendations come with an important caveat, included in the criteria listed above, 
that it is critical to ensure that the analytical methods and outcomes will be accepted by decision 
makers and funding bodies. 
Support for these recommendations comes from examples of the project appraisals for a 
national disability insurance scheme (Productivity Commission 2011) and the NBN (Department 
of Communications and Vertigan 2014). The appraisals of these projects were not detailed 
analyses, but rather straightforward methodologies intended to indicate whether the proposal 
was a worthwhile initiative. These examples indicate a relationship between the level of rigor 
applied to CBA and the political support for the project, highlighting the need for advocacy in 
association with analysis to change policy positions. 
The recommended avoided costs and market rental value approaches are readily implemented, 
as they are based on available data and existing methodologies. While it is important to 
consider whether governments will accept the results of such analyses, the outcomes would 
provide assurance to funding agencies that the long-term social housing construction program 
represents a value proposition on the basis of budget impacts and of net benefit to society.  
5.2 A purposeful and strategic vision for Australian social 
housing 
Given the wider impact of housing market dysfunction on Australian households, political 
leaders and responsible policy-makers need to articulate a case for social housing that 
recognises its wider social, economic and cultural purpose, and establishes a clear, credible 
rationale to treat social housing as a government funding priority. This will inform and 
consolidate community and political support for more effective, efficient and equitable 
government intervention in housing markets.  
With the leadership of a new national housing authority, the development of relevant capacities 
at the national and local level, in cooperation with state and territory governments, will mobilise 
governments’ efforts to implement housing strategies and targets. Other national and regional 
governments are rising to the challenge, and several small nations, such as Finland, now 
deliver world’s best practice in social housing funding, financing and regulation. Australia can 
learn from these efforts, to strengthen its social housing system and address the considerable 
and growing need for affordable and secure housing. 
All levels of government need to work together to further develop the needs assessment and 
financial modelling tools presented in this report, in order to effectively measure and evaluate 
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their community’s unmet need for social housing infrastructure. A national housing authority 
can—in collaboration with national and state policy-makers, mission-orientated financiers, 
builders, landlords and tenants—undertake the qualitative work needed to deliver social housing 
on the required scale.  
In concert with the newly established NHFIC and CEFC and regulatory reform, a well-governed 
capital investment strategy would invest in well-regulated public or private social housing 
providers, adhering to a NFP model and focussed on the societal objective of secure, affordable 
housing for all Australians.  
This Inquiry, and its supporting research projects, shows how well-directed efforts by all 
stakeholders—including Australian governments, the NHFIC and social housing providers—can 
contribute towards social wellbeing and inclusiveness, while at the same time improving 
economic outcomes and providing for stability, prosperity and sustainability. Such a strategy 
need not involve complex financing instruments or reliance on market or private sector 
willingness to engage—rather, the most effective, efficient methods available are within the full 
control of governments. It is time for Australia to take a more productive investment pathway 
and deliver social housing infrastructure to enhance the lives and wellbeing of all in the 
community. 
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